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1 Introduction 
 
In the famous Yassin Abdullah Kadi and Al Barakaat International 
Foundation v Council of the European Union and Commission of the European 
Communities [2008] ECRI-6351 case the European Court of Justice overruled the decision 
by The Court of First Instance based on a need to respect the human rights obligations. The 
Court did however admit to having no competence to “review the validity of a Resolution 
of the United Nations Security Council.1 Did the Security Council exceed its authority with 
the Resolution concerning freezing the funds of individuals who were suspected of 
connections to terrorist organizations? Or can authority even be exceeded if the extent of it 
is left for the operator of the authority itself to determine? What are dangers of allowing an 
intra-governmental organ the power to set its own limits? I will start the thesis by 
presenting the Kadi case along with the Human Rights that have been considered relevant 
in connection to the case as they are portrayed in the United Nation's Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights. One of the rights that need to be considered is the right to a fair trial. 
Also the right to be heard and, the right to property, are relevant in the framework of the 
Kadi case. The principle of legality also needs to be reviewed, or even emphasized, when it 
comes to sanctions that are not strictly based on law. 
  I will also briefly refer to some of the arguments the European Court of 
Justice made concerning the necessity of respecting human rights. I will also try to argue 
that the Security Council’s Resolutions do conflict with the fundamental rights protected 
by many of the constitutions of the United Nations member states and the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights. For the purpose of viewing the newer functions and inherent 
problems of those functions of the Council I will present the relevant facts of the Kadi case 
and the Resolutions of the Council connected to it.  
Next I will look into the details of the Lockerbie case. This time, the threat 
the process posed for the protection of human rights was not due to the Security Council 
                                                
1 ECJ,	  Joined	  Cases	  C-­‐402/05P	  and	  C-­‐415/05P,	  Yassin Abdullah Kadi and Al Barakaat International 
Foundation v Council of the European Union and Commission of the European Communities [2008]	  ECR I-­‐6351	  269-­‐271. 
  
2 
obtaining the role of a judicial organ, but the use of the Council’s authority yet again for 
political gain of some of the permanent members, disregarding international law – the form 
of law that allows the Council the authority it has. The actions of the Security Council in 
these two cases raise a question. Has the development of the possibilities to use the nearly 
unlimited authority the United Nations Charter provides the Council with, turned the 
Security Council into a pawn in the game of international politics instead of a reliable and 
much needed replacement of traditional law enforcement for international law?  
The Aerial Incident at Lockerbie case before the International Court of 
Justice was based on an attempt of the Libyan government to seek recognition to their right 
under international law, to try their own nationals rather than extraditing them to a foreign 
state. What was instead recognized was the supremacy of the Security Council resolutions 
over other of international law.  
The Security Council, trumping international law based on the Montreal 
Convention, stepping on the toes of the International Court of Justice by making a 
Resolution just before the Court had the opportunity to decide a case brought before it and 
disrespecting the sovereignty of Libya by denying it the right to try its nationals accused of 
a terrorist attack instead of turning them over to a foreign state. All of the above was based 
on the powers given to the Council to “maintain peace and security”. What was the 
outcome?  Ad hoc court hearings in the Netherlands with a widely debated result. 
In light of the Kadi and Lockerbie cases disregarding principles of 
international law or human rights does not seem beyond the technical, legal authority of 
the Council. Since the Council was never a neutral organ without the involvement of 
governmental politics, it should not be seen fit to acquire the role of a court of law or the 
protector of human rights, but it, too, needs a monitoring organ to limit the use of its power 
– or rather, restrain the governments of the permanent member states from using the 
Council’s power for their own purposes instead of those enshrined by the Charter. 
After the presentation and assessment of the two noteworthy cases described, 
I will view the authority and function the Security Council has under the United Nations 
Charter and the sanctions it has the right to impose. The historical background of how and 
why the Council was allowed such extensive power is mentioned, in order to ensure a 
more extensive understanding as to why many of those reasons and purposes no longer 
apply.  
The existing structural and political restrictions of the authority of the 
Security Council deserve some attention too, if for no other reason, then to debate whether 
  
3 
there are any and if so, can they be strengthened to create a sufficient counterweight to 
balance out the powers of the Council. The International Court of Justice, human rights, 
general international law, sovereignty of states and international politics can all provide 
reasons for consideration on the Council’s part, even if they cannot actually limit the 
exercise of the Council’s powers.  
The newer functions of the Council have earned attention from international 
law scholars. The quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial roles the Council has taken upon 
itself under its Chapter VII powers will therefore be assessed through the criticism they 
have received. I am not going to claim, however, that the Security Council exceeds its 
authority by performing what have been called quasi-judicial or quasi-legislative acts2, but 
I will be viewing its newfound role in both aspects and question the fact that United 
Nations as a whole is still not bound by any human rights instrument even when its 
arguably most powerful organ can now apparently both legislate and govern in the field of 
international law. 
In my thesis I will attempt to effectively argue that the sanctions the United 
Nations Security Council imposes on individuals may constitute a problem for those many 
member states of the United Nations bound by human rights conventions and 
constitutional norms and should do so for United Nations itself as an international 
organization. I will compare the protection and the development of human rights within the 
European Union to that on the more global scale, especially considering the United 
Nations and present the teleological interpretation exercised by the Court of European 
Communities especially in the beginning of the development of the practises and law of 
the European Communities. The Court helped shape the present-day European Union to 
what it is and in effect with the help of the European Court of Human Rights brought the 
human rights to the spotlight in the development of the Union. 
The European development in the protection of and respect for human rights 
is inspiring when contemplating ways to limit the actions of an international organization 
or its organs. In recent past also the European Union was criticized for the fact that it itself 
was not bound by any human rights treaties while all of the member states had obligations 
to respect human rights connected to both their constitutions and their involvement in 
human rights conventions, mainly the European Convention on Human Rights.  
                                                
2 Johnstone, Ian: Legislation and Adjudication in the Un Security Council: Bringing down the Deliberative 
Deficit, The American Journal of International Law, Volume 102, Number 2, 2008 p.275-308 
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The situation caused conflicts or at least risks of conflicts between honouring 
the human rights commitments of the member states and their commitment to the 
supremacy of the treaties of the Communities and later the Union. Especially the 
constitutional courts of Italy and of the Federal Republic of Germany were reluctant to 
accept the supremacy of European Union law and expressly the exclusive right of the 
European Court of Justice to determine whether the European Community laws were in 
conflict with human rights commitments of the member states or not3. The European 
development has been portrayed as a model possibly adaptable to a worldwide 
organization such as the United Nations.4 
I will also briefly review the concept of democracy and the democratic 
entitlement of governments to govern the people of their state, since originally human 
rights were very much a concept set to protect citizens from governments that abuse their 
power to deprive people of their fundamental rights and debate whether the roles have 
turned inside out, if the states and their constitutional human rights guarantees may need 
protection against organs created by international law? Should the United Nations move 
towards the direction the European Union did, finally accepting the responsibility of being 
committed to a human rights instrument, a binding convention? 
I will, as implied,  be arguing that the concept and existence of the Security 
Council as it is might already be outdated – despite the fact that it has only started fulfilling 
its original function a couple of decades ago – and go through some of the improvement 
suggestions. These will not include suggestions for changing the United Nations Charter 
though, partly because of the limited space, partly because I feel that the authority of the 
Security Council and the permanent members of the Council are not close to being 
restricted through alterations of the Charter.  
It need not be mentioned that for democracy to actually be realized in full, 
much of the decision-making should happen on a national instead of the global level5, 
which to me seems like the ultimate dilemma of international politics as well as 
international law. Global policy and decision making is all the more important in a 
changing world, despite the inherent problems the concept entails. The process of decision-
                                                
3 Weiler, Joseph: Eurocracy and Distrust: Some Questions Concerning the Role of  the European Court of 
Justice in the Protection of Fundamental Human Rights within the Legal Order of the European Communities, 
Washington Law Review, Volume 61, 1986 p. 1106 
4 Petersmann, Ernst-Ulrich, Time for a United Nations “Global Compact” for Integrating Human Rights into 
the Law of Worldwide Organizations: Lessons from European Integration p. 648-650 
5 For the people to be able to influence the decisions that affect their interests. See eg. Franck, Thomas M: 
The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, The American Journal of International Law, Volume 86, 
Number1, 1992, on the construction of the concept “democratic entitlement”. 
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making in the Security Council has been accused of its exclusive nature and suggestions 
have been made to allow even the slightest of change in the circumstances6.  
I have chosen the two cases of Kadi and Lockerbie to be viewed in my thesis 
for the purpose of portraying how the authority of the Council can be abused in two 
different ways to achieve the aspired goals often connected to national interests. A great 
number of states are more or less bound by at least some human rights treaty or instrument. 
Obviously, the nature of human rights treaties requires them to restrict the actions of 
governments and states they bind, which is not always a desirable outcome for the 
government in question.  
Human rights are, nevertheless, not the only restriction the governments face 
when deliberating possible actions at the time of conflicts or problems – other states 
constitute, or better yet, their sovereignty constitutes one as well. Both restrictions are 
often produced and organized by international law and international organizations. The 
Kadi case exemplifies how the authority of the Security Council can be used to circumvent 
the restrictions of the first, the Lockerbie case the latter.  
Of course, human rights are not a concept free of political interpretations and 
discretion and have been subject to criticism as well. There are dangers in allowing human 
rights as a source of teleological interpretation, since the discretionary powers can prove 
vast enough for new opportunities to abuse the power. Granting judicial organs the power 
to challenge legislation has been suspected to result in an international community lead by 
judges alone.7  
As stated, the thesis will review the background of the authority held by the 
United Nations Security Council, two cases that I consider excellent examples of the 
problems created by the seemingly unlimited powers of the Council and possible sources 
of restrictions to those powers. The teleological interpretations of the European Court of 
Justice that helped shape the development of the European Communities is also presented 
as an example of the creativity that can allow the otherwise slow process of international 
law-making to keep up with the more rapidly changing reality. 
 What I am essentially trying to prove maintaining, is that the United Nations 
and the Security Council as they are today cannot be taken as a lasting solution for 
maintaining international peace and security in future, preserved in the design that was 
created in very different circumstances right after the Second World War. Constant 
                                                
6 Johnstone, 2008 p. 275-308 
7 Weiler, Joseph: 1986 p.1103-1105 
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development is needed to meet the requirements of the constantly evolving world and the 
challenges the changes bring.  
Like mentioned already, the thesis is built upon the assumption that changing 
the Charter is not a realistic alternative at the moment and looks for solutions to the 
presented problems elsewhere. Gradually changing the present standpoints, deliberation 
procedures could amount to a sufficient correction of the power locus around the Security 
Council. If not, the International Court of Justice adopting a more teleological style of 
interpretation to reign in the actions of the Council could pose as a last resort to finding the 
necessary check to the  balances. 
2 Kadi Case 
 
2.1 Sanctions in Practice 
 
The Security Council has not ruled on the specifics of the sanctions on its 
own, but has rather delegated its powers to special committees created to manage the 
sanctions in practise, starting with being in charge of the lists of the individuals the 
sanctions will concern. The Sanctioning bodies proceed to supervise the implementing of 
the sanctions and controlling the lists of targets.8 
The Council appointed a ”1267 Committee” (according to Resolution 1267) 
to control and oversee the sanctions that were to be imposed. The Committee maintains a 
list of individuals and entities that the sanctions are targeted against and the Counter-
Terrorism Committee oversees the implementation of said sanctions. The main issue with 
the regime and the so-called Consolidated List it maintains is the procedure for listing or 
de-listing. Listing of an individual may occur if a listing proposal is put forward and no 
Committee member opposes to it. The criteria to proposing a new listing are not 
specifically determined. Before November 2002 it was also not possible to apply de-listing 
and even then continued to be a procedure with which the individual in question will need 
the help of a government.9 
  When a de-listing procedure was introduced in reaction to the criticism the 
                                                
8 Farral, Jeremy Matam: United Nations Sanctions and the Rule of Law, Cambridge University Press, 2007 
p.146-155 
9 Finley, Lorraine: Between A Rock and A Hard Place: The Kadi Decision and Judicial Review of Security 
Council Resolutions, Tulane Journal of International & Comparative Law, Vol. 18 Issue 2, 2010 p. 479-482 
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Security Council sanctions regime received, some de-listings occurred swiftly10. This alone 
should prove that the original listing procedure was deficient, since it allowed new listings 
to be made without clear criteria that needed to be met. Also, the listing procedure suffered 
from lack of transparency, since all the supporting facts as to why a certain individual shall 
be listed are processed within the Committee.11  
  Furthermore, the introduced de-listing procedure was still quite rigid and 
inflexible, as the individual that wished to be de-listed needs to contact a government of a 
state and apply for the de-listing through them. Human rights were originally intended as a 
protection for individuals against arbitrariness of the governments, so making the 
realization of one's rights depended on a government again, was most definitely not the 
ideal solution. It appears that if a person failed to convince the government of his country 
of citizenship or of residence that his rights had been violated, he could not effectively 
advance his cause in any way. 
 After the de-listing procedure was created, any individual had the right to 
approach the Committee directly, but only governmental authorities were allowed to apply 
for a person to be removed from the list. Each committee member also still has a right of 
veto, so if any of the members refuse the requested removal and the Security Council 
agrees, the individual who deems his rights infringed is left with no other possible 
remedies.12  
  In addition, the Guidelines of the Sanctions Committee did not oblige the 
Committee to provide the appellant with any reasons or evidence as to why his name was 
submitted to the list or why the requested removal could not be agreed to. In the Kadi case, 
no such evidence or reasoning had been presented to the appellants, nor had they been 
informed of the fact that their funds would be the target of freezing. This gave the 
appellants no possibility to defend themselves, as no direct accusations were ever made to 
them.13 
  The wide-ranging criticism to the sanctioning policies of the 1267 Committee 
has compelled the Security Council to improve the transparency of the procedure and 
introduce a de-listing procedure with new amended resolutions. At first, no de-listing could 
                                                
10 Finley, 2010 p. 483 
11 Finley, 2010 p. 481-482 
12 ECJ, Joined Cases C-402/05P and C-415/05P, Yassin Abdullah Kadi and Al Barakaat International 
Foundation v Council of the European Union and Commission of the European Communities [2008] ECR I-
6351  364 
13 ECJ, Joined Cases C-402/05P and C-415/05P, Yassin Abdullah Kadi and Al Barakaat International 
Foundation v Council of the European Union and Commission of the European Communities [2008] ECR I-
6351 345-348 and 369 
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be applied. Primarily the Sanctions Committee allowed Member states to submit de-listing 
requests and finally the concept of Ombudsperson was also introduced as a quarter to be 
approached with such requests. The individual who wishes to be de-listed can request said 
de-listing from a specially appointed Ombudsperson.14 
  Transparency of the procedure and legitimacy of the sanctions were improved 
by the decision to release narrative summaries of the reasons the designating states 
provided when they proposed adding the person or entity in question to the Consolidated 
List and by obligating the states to submit a detailed statement to the Committee when 
proposing a new listing. 15  
  The narrative summaries entail the reasons the designating state has provided 
the Committee with when making a suggestion to add new individuals or entities to the list 
with the exception of matters the state has requested to be kept secret. The designating 
states need to state their case in detail, which might be considered to improve the 
probability of legitimacy. The Committee needs to reach a consensus to accept the 
requested removal from the list. If no consensus can be reached, the matter will be 
reviewed and decided by the Security Council.16 
  Notwithstanding, the procedure is very much inter-governmental, which does 
not ensure the individual respect of his rights. The de-listing procedure cannot be 
considered substitutive of a trial. Also, the person’s right to be heard is still disregarded 
and the person cannot prevent the listing beforehand. Furthermore, for the sanctions to 
meet the requirement of proportionality, it seems that the freezing of the funds should in no 
circumstances be applicable to the funds needed to cover basic expenses.  
 
2.2 The Related Articles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
 
2.2.1 The Right to Property and the Right to Leave a Country 
 
  The Security Council Resolutions that compels states to apply targeted 
sanctions on individuals are a cause for concern in terms of fundamental human rights. The 
sanctions applied on individuals include travel bans and freezing of assets. The following 
Articles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights can be in conflict with said travel 
                                                
14 UN Security Council Resolution 1904 (2009) 20-25 
15 UN Security Council Resolution 1904 (2009) 11-12 
16 UN Security Council Resolution 1989 (2011) 23 
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bans and asset freezes.  
 
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights Article 13, paragraph 2 states that:  
 
“Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his 
country.” 
 
The Article 17 of the Declaration states that: 
 
“Everyone has the right to own property alone as well as in association with others 
and that no one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property.” 
 
  What might be considered the more pressing problem though, is the the 
violation of the rights that allow individuals means to dispute governmental interference in 
their fundamental rights – namely the violation of the right to a fair trial and the right to be 
heard. 
 
2.2.2 The Right to a Fair Trial 
 
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights Article 8 states that: 
 
“Everyone has the right to an effective remedy by the competent national tribunals for 
acts violating the fundamental rights granted him by the constitution or by law.”  
 
  In case of a Security Council imposed sanction, however, the national tribunals 
are not competent to rule for the defendant to be removed from the list of the sanctions 
committee. No “effective remedy” can be concluded to exist, which is clearly problematic 
in respect of human rights obligations established by the declaration.  
  According to the guidelines of the Sanctions Committee, the removal of an 
individual’s or entity’s name from the list can be requested through the government of the 
state of residency or of citizenship17, but that can hardly be viewed as the “effective 
                                                
17 ECJ,	  Joined	  Cases	  C-­‐402/05P	  and	  C-­‐415/05P,	  Yassin	  Abdullah	  Kadi	  and	  Al	  Barakaat	  International	  
Foundation	  v	  Council	  of	  the	  European	  Union	  and	  Commission	  of	  the	  European	  Communities	  [2008]	  ECR	  I-­‐6351	  	  324	  
 
  
10 
remedy” conveyed by the article because the person in question could not make the request 
without the help of a willing government. Even though the Committee guidelines do entail 
a right for the person in question to address the Committee directly, the lack transparency 
in the decision making and refusal to release evidence severely damaged the individual’s 
possibilities to defend themselves, until the introduction of the Ombudsperson. 
 
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights Article 10 states that: 
 
“Everyone is entitled in full equality to a fair and public hearing by an    independent 
and impartial tribunal, in the determination of his rights and obligations and of any 
criminal charge against him.” 
 
Article 11 of the Declaration, paragraph 2, declares that: 
 
“Everyone charged with a penal offence has the right to be presumed innocent until 
proved guilty according to law in a public trial at which he has had all the guarantees 
necessary for his defence.”  
 
  The articles do refer to a penal offence and to a criminal charge, while the 
Security Council works on the ground for “threat to international peace”, but I would 
however take the articles into consideration. Accusing an individual of constituting a threat 
to international peace and security does not necessarily mean the person has already 
committed a crime, but presumably is either going to commit one or assist in criminal 
(terrorist) activity.  
  Already the framework is relatively vague and effectively proving someone is 
about to participate in terrorist activity in court proceedings is a harder task to manage than 
establishing a committee to decide on a list of people who might be suspected of 
involvement in terrorist activity. It appears that the right to be presumed innocent is not 
effectively considered in the proceedings of the Committees established by the Security 
Council to regulate the use of the sanctions. 
  The Rights established in the Declaration of Human Rights that the sanctions 
are directly conflict with are the ones that declare right to property and right to leave a 
country. These rights could be subject to legal limitations on the basis of “international 
security”, if the matter was approached differently. 
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2.2.3 Restricting Limitations to Human Rights As Established in the Declaration 
 
  While securing international peace and security by trying to prevent terrorist 
operations certainly can constitute a valid argument to restricting individual rights, the 
limitations should still be applied carefully and accordingly. The Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, Article 29, paragraph 2 clearly states that:  
 
“Everyone shall be subject to -- limitations as are determined by law solely for the 
purpose of  securing due recognition and respect for other rights and freedoms and 
of meeting the just requirements of morality, public order and the general welfare 
in a democratic society. “ 
 
  Attention should especially be drawn to the phrase “limitations as are 
determined by law”. Does the United Nations Charter qualify as “law” in the context and 
purpose of the Declaration of Human Rights? Does the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights not qualify as “principles” the Security Council must act in accordance with even 
though the United Nations Charter specifically refers to encouraging respect for human 
rights as one of its purposes in Chapter I?  
  To be in accordance with the international obligations, the limitations to 
fundamental human rights, for example to those stated in the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, must meet three requirements: first of all, they need to be determined by 
law. Secondly, the grounds for the limitations must be legitimate and thirdly the limitations 
must in proportion to the end sought to be achieved. The requirement the Security Council 
adopted sanctions most clearly fails to meet is the first – the principle of legality.18 
  The only criterion applied to the principle of legality is not that a legal norm 
that determines the limitation to a fundamental right exists. Such legal norm must also be 
accessible and sufficiently explicit for a person to be able to decipher just what limitations 
have been enacted to restrict the execution of his rights.19 
  A question can be raised to reflect on whether the requirement for 
proportionality is met either. The regulations of the Sanctions Committee give the national 
authorities the right to declare the freezing of the funds exclusively applicable to the 
                                                
18 Babar, Mohamed Elewa; International Journal of Human Rights, Vol. 7 Issue 4, Winter 2003, p.64 
19 Babar, 2003 p.67-70 
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owner’s excess assets – not funds needed for basic expenses such as accommodation and 
nutrition. Also funds for “extraordinary expenses” may be unfrozen with the specific 
permission of the Committee. Furthermore, the funds necessary for basic expenses cannot 
be excluded from the application if the Sanctions Committee “expressly objects”. That is 
to say, the individual is nevertheless subject to the arbitrariness of the Security Council 
Sanctions Regime.20  
  The measures taken to prevent terrorist organizations from financing their 
activities can be regarded disproportionate, since even allowing the listed individuals the 
funds for the most basic expenses, including accommodation, medical care and food, can 
be refused without publicly presenting all the evidence against the person in question. 
Moreover, the unfreezing the funds needs to be requested.21 
  The European Court of Justice took the view that the Council was acting ultra 
vires, as it did not act in accordance with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations 
as it must do according to the Charter. It did not however conclude that the human rights in 
question were in relation to jus cogens. The European Court of Justice stated that even 
though the related human rights norms did not entail jus cogens, restrictions to limiting 
said rights still existed.22  
2.3 Assessing the Kadi judgment and its significance 
 
2.3.1 The Established Conflicts with Human Rights 
 
  The Security Council sanctions regimes are created to deal with specific 
situations that have arisen to threaten the international peace and security. As such, they 
are more of ad hoc nature than they are stable, independent judicial or administrative 
organs. Another fundamental human rights related deficiency of the Security Council 
sanctions resolutions is the fact that no court of law has been given the competence to rule 
on their lawfulness. The required “effective remedy” for an individual whose assets have 
                                                
20 ECJ, Joined Cases C-402/05P and C-415/05P, Yassin Abdullah Kadi and Al Barakaat International 
Foundation v Council of the European Union and Commission of the European Communities [2008] ECR I-
6351 364 
21 ECJ, Joined Cases C-402/05P and C-415/05P, Yassin Abdullah Kadi and Al Barakaat International 
Foundation v Council of the European Union and Commission of the European Communities [2008] ECR I-
6351 364 
22 ECJ, Joined Cases C-402/05P and C-415/05P, Yassin Abdullah Kadi and Al Barakaat International 
Foundation v Council of the European Union and Commission of the European Communities [2008] ECR I-
6351 266-270 
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been frozen and who has been given a travel ban, does not really exist –at least not in full.  
  The idea that the Security Council would have more discretion in limiting 
human rights than what can be allowed the national governments seems contradictory. If a 
government cannot deny their citizens or residents their fundamental rights invoking the 
notion of “national security” without a strict legal basis, why then can the same 
government be obligated to do so on the basis of “international security” by an 
international organ that was created by an inter-governmental treaty? The concept can be 
regarded paradoxical, especially when the individual is left without an effective remedy, 
supposedly guaranteed to him by the same fundamental human rights. 
  The individual targeted with the so-called “smart sanctions” do not receive 
information on the evidence submitted against them, nor can they apply for a right to 
obtain said evidence. The Sanctions Committee guidelines do not obligate the Committee 
to deliver any such information to the individuals or entities that have been listed. 
Furthermore, if any of the Committee Members opposes, no de-listing can occur, even if 
the person in question has managed to convince a government to aid them in applying the 
removal from the list.23 
  The person has a right to be presumed innocent, a right to be heard and a right 
for guarantees necessary for his defence. Nevertheless, a court to which he could appeal to 
have the ban lifted and assets freed has not been appointed. The only way to challenge the 
Security Council Resolution, or more appropriately, the decision of the sanctions regime in 
question, is through political organs. Since the respect for Human Rights is one of the 
Purposes and Principles mentioned in the United Nations Charter, it seems the Security 
Council has also failed to act in accordance with the Purposes and Principles of the United 
Nations, even having an obligation to do so.  
  The notions to “national security” and “public safety” should be met with 
reservation when it comes to excusing limitations to human rights on the basis of said 
concepts as they do not meet the requirements of specificity and definition. Their vague 
nature allows the states or, in the case of the United Nations Security Council, organs of 
international organizations the possibility to limit the execution of human rights on the 
basis of something that might “desirable” rather than “necessary”. 24 
  The fact that the procedures for listing and de-listing and individual or an entity 
                                                
23 ECJ, Joined Cases C-402/05P and C-415/05P, Yassin Abdullah Kadi and Al Barakaat International 
Foundation v Council of the European Union and Commission of the European Communities [2008] ECR I-
6351 324-325 
24 Babar, 2003 p.78-83 
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on the “Consolidated List” have been changed in order to improve the transparency and 
legitimacy of the sanctions with regard to respect for human rights, needs to be admitted. 
The introduction of an Ombudsman that can be contacted directly in order to request 
removal from the list is an important improvement. Furthermore, the release of the 
narrative summaries of the reasons to enlist the persons or entities allows the individuals 
concerned a chance to become acquainted with what they are being accused of.  
  However, no effective remedy by the national tribunals is available and no fair 
and public hearing is to be organized when a de-listing is requested. The sanctions that 
impose limitations to the execution of one’s rights are still not based on explicit legal 
norms. The United Nations Security Council expressly states that “all – measures (the 
Committee is allowed to take) are preventive in nature and are not reliant on criminal 
standards set out under national law”25. That is to say, notwithstanding the punitive effects 
of the sanctions, the Security Council refuses to be bound by standards that restrict 
criminal punishment on the basis of human rights obligations. 
 It appears that it can be concluded that the Security Council sanctions that are 
applied against individuals are in conflict with human rights, especially with the right to be 
heard and the right to a fair trial. Since the limitations to fundamental human rights need to 
be specifically regulated by the law, the framework the Security Council acts within under 
the United Nations Charter seems too vague to meet the demands for restricting those 
rights. Operating against international terrorism might be a valid enough reason to limit 
human rights, but it must be done in accordance with the obligations set forth by the 
principles of international law and for example the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights. 
2.3.2 Compliance Issues Resulting from the “Kadi Resolutions” 
 
That what followed from the first Kadi case before the European Court of 
Justice was a renewal of the freezing of the funds and Kadi turned to the European Union 
judicature again for the reinforcement of his rights. The position of the judicature of the 
EU had not changed despite the changes in the procedures of the Sanctions Committee or 
the fact that the European Commission allowed Kadi a chance to comment on a summary 
of the reasons for targeting him with the asset freeze and the General Court maintained 
that: 
                                                
25 Comparative Table Regarding the United Nations Security Council Committees Established Pursuant to 
Resolutions 1267 (1999), 1373 (2001) and 1540 (2004) 
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“In essence, the Security Council has still not deemed it appropriate to establish an 
independent and impartial body responsible for hearing and determining, as regards 
matters of law and fact, actions against individual decisions taken by the Sanctions 
Committee. Furthermore, neither the focal point mechanism nor the Office of the 
Ombudsperson affects the principle that removal of a person from the Sanctions 
Committee’s list requires consensus within the committee. Moreover, the evidence 
which may be disclosed to the person concerned continues to be a matter entirely at 
the discretion of the State which proposed that he be included on the Sanctions 
Committee’s list and there is no mechanism to ensure that sufficient information be 
made available to the person concerned in order to allow him to defend himself 
effectively (he need not even be informed of the identity of the State which has 
requested his inclusion on the Sanctions Committee’s list). For those reasons at 
least, the creation of the focal point and the Office of the Ombudsperson cannot be 
equated with the provision of an effective judicial procedure for review of decisions 
of the Sanctions Committee.”26 
 
The General Court also, reviewing the earlier Kadi judgment of the Court of Justice, 
indicated that the freezing of funds could not be allowed ‘immunity from jurisdiction’ by 
virtue of the supremacy of the Security Council Resolutions under Chapter VII of the UN 
Charter and due to the fact that measures on European Union level were taken to 
implement such Resolution.27 
 The key problems of the freezing of assets had remained unaltered. The 
Court found itself unable to review the lawfulness of the measures, since no evidence 
against Kadi was provided for investigation by the judicature. Due to lack of information 
as to why Kadi was suspected and thus to be sanctioned, the Court considered the 
applicant’s right to effective judicial review violated.28 Further, the Court held that: 
 
“—[T]he contested regulation was adopted without any real guarantee being given 
as to the disclosure of the evidence used against the applicant or as to his actually 
being properly heard in that regard, and it must therefore be concluded that the 
                                                
26 T-85/09 Kadi vs. European Commission article 128 
27 T-85/09 Kadi vs. European Commission article 132 
28 T-85/09 Kadi vs. European Commission articles 182-183 
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regulation was adopted according to a procedure in which the rights of the defence 
were not observed --.”29 
 
The measures taken to freeze the funds of Kadi were annulled once more and the judgment 
was not the first siding with the appellant since the renewal of the freezing of Kadi’s funds. 
Switzerland had delisted Kadi already before the first ruling of the European Court of 
Justice, not being bound by European Union legislation.30 The Supreme Court of United 
Kingdom followed by delisting Kadi in the judgment of the case Her Majesty's Treasury v. 
Mohammed Jabar Ahmed and Others even after the renewal of the listing for Kadi’s part 
by European Commission and the Security Council Sanctions Committee clarifying the 
grounds for listing him in the first place.31 
 3 Lockerbie – rule of law in the struggle against terrorism 
 
3.1 Aerial Incident at Lockerbie 
 
In this part of my thesis I attempt to present the facts of the case and also 
view the handling of the situation by the United Nations, the Security Council and the 
International Court of Justice and governments of states involved. I will debate the 
distribution of powers between the Security Council and the International Court of Justice 
and review the role of the Security Council especially after the Cold War period. I will 
attempt to focus on the problematic of an intra-governmental organ having a quasi-judicial 
function and that the authority of said organ can be argued to lack a proper system of 
checks and balances. I will start with viewing the development and the facts of the case on 
a relatively general sense and then move on to presenting the relevant treaty articles, such 
as the Montreal Convention and also other international legal norms that need to be looked 
at.  
Finally, I will conclude the viewing of the case with analysis of the criticism 
for the Lockerbie case and the actions of the parties involved; the Security Council, the 
governments, the International Court of Justice and the Scottish court that was created 
                                                
29 T-85/09 Kadi vs. European Commission article 184 
30 OMB Watch Timeline of Kadi Litigation in EU and U.S. “The Kadi Case: Court Decisions on Due 
Process for Terror Listing Differ in EU, U.S,” 3 April 2012, Charity & Security Network website 
31 HM Treasury v Mohammed Jabar Ahmed and Others (2010) UKSC2, article 249-251 
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solely for the trial of the two Libyan suspects. I will also try to review the situation in 
terms of credibility and legitimacy of the current system in international law and politics, 
when respect for Human Rights has gained more ground and yet relatively unlimited 
powers have been given to an intra-governmental organ that is not directly responsible to 
any democratic instance. 
 
3.2 Lockerbie Case Facts 
 
 
When Pan Am flight number 103 exploded mid-air and crash-landed into the 
Scottish village of Lockerbie, international law and politicians faced a new kind of 
challenge considering how to handle the unavoidable repercussions of the incident. 
Questions involved included state responsibility, rule of law, international criminal 
tribunals, extradition, human rights and the threat of terrorism and its management. The 
crisis caused by the attack was both political and legal.  
Pan Am flight number 103, on its way from London to New York exploded 
above a Scottish village of Lockerbie. All the crew of the aircraft, the passengers and 11 
residents of Lockerbie where killed when the plane crashed into the village. The victims 
were mostly American citizens. Investigations conducted by the Scottish police led to the 
conclusion that the explosion was caused by a timer bomb placed in the cargo hold of the 
aircraft.  
The people suspected of the attack where to Libyan nationals Abdelbaset ali 
Mohamed Al Megrahi and Al Amin Khalifa Fhimah, who were also secret service agents 
of Libya. The United States and United Kingdom both turned to Libya, requesting the 
extradition of suspects and renunciation of terrorist activity. Libya made a statement 
renounce terrorism and declaring no involvement whatsoever in the execution of the 
attack. Libya also offered to co-operate in the investigations and allow the investigators 
access to the information and documents in their possession. However, referring to the lack 
of an extradition treaty between the countries, Libya refused the extradition of its nationals 
and declared competence to try the accused herself.  
Under the Montreal Convention, Libya had the right either to try the suspects 
or extradite them – aut dedere, aut judicare. The United States and the United Kingdom 
however, did not respond to the requests of co-operation but accused Libya of trying to 
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hide its support for the terrorist attack and continued pressuring Libya into surrendering the 
suspects to the United States for a trial and taking responsibility for the attacks through the 
Security Council, which they are both permanent members of. Libya reacted by turning to 
the International Court of Justice for a verdict stating that Libya has fulfilled its obligations 
under the Montreal Convention and that the United States and the United Kingdom should 
refrain from their actions aiming to pressure Libya into extraditing the suspects. The 
United States and the UK, in turn, sought support to their claims by acting on a Security 
Council Resolution under Chapter VII of the Charter. 
After the Security Council Resolution’s interference, which led to the 
subsequent failure of the International Court of Justice to rule to the advantage of Libya, 
the situation remained unsolved. The mediation of United Nations finally resulted in a 
compromise of moving the trial to the Netherlands but creating an ad hoc Scottish tribunal 
to rule on the case. On January 30, 2001 Al Megrahi was found guilty and the other 
accused, Fhimah acquitted. The succeeding appeal did not result in changes in the verdict. 
Later Al Megrahi was released on humanitarian grounds due to his terminal illness of 
which he died last year. 
 
3.3 Comments – International Court of Justice and the Security Council 
 
In the Resolution 731 of the Security Council, the Council expresses deep 
concern over the “persistence of acts of international terrorism in all forms, including those 
in which States are directly or indirectly involved”, “deplores the fact that the Libyan 
Government has not yet responded effectively to the above requests to cooperate fully” and 
“urges the Libyan Government immediately to provide a full and effective response.”32 
Since Libya, according to the United States, failed to give such full and effective response, 
which to them would probably have entailed renunciation of support for terrorism and 
surrendering the suspects, the Security Council returned to the case with another 
Resolution.  
This time, with the Resolution 748, the Council chose to at under Chapter VII 
of the United Nations Charter, calling upon states to apply sanctions against Libya, since it 
had not, in the opinion of the Council, “provided a full an effective response”. What 
constitutes a full and effective response is not explained in detail. Libya could be argued to 
                                                
32 Security Council Resolution S/RES/731 (1992) 
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have given such a response already, having persistently applied the Montreal Convention 
with precision.33  
The International Court of Justice refrained from passing judgment on the 
situation in the light of the Montreal Convention, since according to the United Nations 
Charter; Security Council Resolutions take priority over all other international obligations 
of the member states. The respondents, the United States and the United Kingdom denied 
the Court of having jurisdiction in the case at all, but the Court denied such claims by 
being able to base its jurisdiction on the Montreal Convention. After the adoption of 
Security Council measures under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, the Court 
views that the rights of Libya under the Montreal Convention are overridden by the rights 
conferred to the United Nations by the Security Council Resolution.34 
3.4 The trial in the Netherlands 
 
The trial in Camp Zeist, the Netherlands was a compromise engineered by 
the United Nations. The United Nations and the United Kingdom were not able to agree 
with Libya on the necessity of extradition, so the trial was moved to neutral ground, to the 
Netherlands. The tribunal set to rule on the matter and on the culpability of Al Megrahi and 
Fhimah, consisted of Scottish judges, acting under Scottish law with the exception of 
ruling without a jury.35  
The prosecution presented their conception of the events as follows. The 
bomb was placed inside a piece of unaccompanied luggage on a flight from Luqa, Malta to 
Frankfurt, Germany. They viewed that the introduction of the luggage at Malta pointed 
towards Libya. The luggage containing the bomb was transferred from Frankfurt to 
London and placed on the hold of the Pan Am flight 103.  
Some of the clothing in the bag with the bomb was identified by a Maltese 
shop owner as having been bought at his shop. The Maltese shop owner also identified Al 
Megrahi as the customer who purchased the items found in the same suitcase with the 
bomb. The police found a piece of the circuit board of the bomb and was able to make a 
                                                
33 Weller, Mark: The Lockerbie Case: A Premature End to the ”New World Order?”, African Journal of 
Imternational and Comparative Law , Volume 4, 1992 p. 313-314 
34 International Court of Justcie: Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Provisional Measures) 2001 articles 43-44 
35 Knowles, Julian B: The Lockerbie Judgments: A Short Ananlysis, Case Western Reserve Journal of 
International Law 2004, p 473 
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possible connection to Libya through the manufacturer. A Libyan informant of the United 
States identified both suspects as secret service agents of Libya.36  
Unfortunately, there were several gaps in the evidence led of the prosecution. 
First of all, the only evidence tying Al Megrahi to the suitcase that contained the bomb, is 
the shop owner’s identification, which he himself would not describe positive and which, 
given the time that passed between the events and his questioning, his statement cannot be 
considered entirely convincing. There is also a possibility that he (subconsciously) 
identified Al Megrahi also based on seeing his face on many occasions in the media. His 
statement also somewhat changed during the questioning.37  
Secondly, it was not proven with absolute certainty that the date of the 
purchase was in fact December 7th and not November 23rd, when Al Megrahi was not in 
Malta. The report on uncovering the date was based on the shop owner’s recollection of 
the weather that day and statement that there was international football shown on television 
on the day of the purchase. In fact, the presented evidence seemed to prove that it was 
more likely the purchase was made on the 23rd. Yet, the judges held it proved that the date 
of purchase was precisely December 7th.38 
Also, even though the circuit board is of the same type that has been ordered 
by Libya, the deliveries have not been made exclusively to Libya, so it is most definitely a 
possibility that terrorist of an entirely different nationality would have been able to get a 
hold of such devices. Identifying of the two suspects as agents of the Libyan secret service 
was the only part of the testimony of Abdul Majid, the Libyan informant of the CIA, the 
court found convincing and gave no reasons as to why this was the case.39 
Another ill-fitting piece of evidence had to do with the suitcase that had 
allegedly been flown to London from Malta, via Frankfurt. However, there is not record of 
an unaccompanied bag on the flight from Malta to Frankfurt and there seems not to have 
been any gaps in the security control of the luggage at Luqa Airport in Malta. Furthermore, 
such gap was shown to have existed at Heathrow, before the luggage of the flight 103 was 
taken to the hold of the aircraft.40  
Nevertheless, the Court’s verdict defied logic and found Al Megrahi guilty as 
charged and sentenced him to life. It did not feel the need to explain why certain pieces of 
                                                
36 Knowles, 2004 and Black, Robert: Lockerbie: A Satisfactory Process But a Flawed Result, Case Western 
Reserve Journal of International Law 2004 
37 Knowles, Julian, B. 2004 p. 477-479 
38 Black, Robert, 2004 p. 445 
39 Black, Robert, 2004 p. 444-445 
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evidence were disregarded and the evidence of the prosecution was classified as sufficient 
for a conviction beyond reasonable doubt despite the inconsistencies and conflicts that 
were pointed out.41 The eventual appeal did not change the verdict. 
 
3.5 Relevant Norms 
 
3.5.1 The Montreal Convention of 1971 
 
According to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against 
the Safety of Civil Aviation, also know as the Montreal Convention of 1971, Article 1: 
 
Any person commits an offence if he unlawfully and intentionally: 
a) performs an act of violence against a person on board an aircraft in 
flight if that act is likely to endanger the safety of that aircraft; or 
b) destroys an aircraft in service or causes damage to such an aircraft 
which renders it incapable of flight or which is likely to endanger its 
safety in flight; or 
c.places or causes to be placed on an aircraft in service, by any means 
whatsoever, a device or substance which is likely to destroy that 
aircraft, or to cause damage to it which renders it incapable of flight, or 
to cause damage to it which is likely to endanger its safety in flight. 
 
 
Article 5 
1. Each Contracting State shall take such measures as may be necessary to establish 
its jurisdiction over the offences in the following cases: 
     a) when the offence is committed in the territory of that State; 
b) when the offence is committed against or on board an aircraft registered in that 
State; 
c) when the aircraft on board which the offence is committed lands in its territory 
with the alleged offender still on board; 
d) when the offence is committed against or on board an aircraft leased without crew 
to a lessee who has his principal place of business or, if the lessee has no such place 
of business, his permanent residence, in that State. 
                                                
41 Black, Robert, 2004 p. 445-447 
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Article 6 
1. Upon being satisfied that the circumstances so warrant, any Contracting State 
in the territory of which the offender or the alleged offender is present, shall 
take him into custody or take other measures to ensure his presence. The 
custody and other measures shall be as provided in the law of that State but may 
only be continued for such time as is necessary to enable any criminal or 
extradition proceedings to be instituted. 
   2. Such State shall immediately make a preliminary enquiry into the facts.  
 
Article 7 
The Contracting State in the territory of which the alleged offender is found 
shall, if it does not extradite him, be obliged, without exception whatsoever and 
whether or not the offence was committed in its territory, to submit the case to 
its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution. Those authorities shall 
take their decision in the same manner as in the case of any ordinary offence of 
a serious nature under the law of that State. 
 
It seems safe to conclude that Libya did fulfill its obligations under the 
Montreal Convention. The presence of the suspects was ensured, the investigations were 
begun and Libya had expressed its willingness to cooperate in other ways besides 
extradition. Libya also denied participation and support to terrorism and there was no 
evidence to prove its involvement in the attack, since the involvement of the two suspects 
had not been proved either.  
The principle of aut dedere, aut judicare is clearly stated in the Convention, 
which confirms that involving the Security Council was both unnecessary and in 
contradiction to other obligations under international law. A state that abides by its 
international obligations should not be faced with pressuring measures ordered by a 
Security Council resolution under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, not even 
though the Security Council does hold the power to override other treaty obligations of the 
member states. With all likelihood, this power was not intended to invalidate international 
treaties and allow states a measure for disregarding commitments that do not correlate to 
their political aims in a precise situation.  
With regard to the Lockerbie case, had the Security Council not been asked 
to interfere by the United States and the United Kingdom, both states would most likely 
  
23 
have had to accept Libya’s offer to try the suspects after investigating the case in co-
operation. In theory, had the victims of the terrorist attack not been nationals of permanent 
members of the Security Council, the outcome might have been very different indeed. 
3.5.2 The European Convention on Human Rights 
 
The relevant articles of the European Convention on Human Rights are listed here, because 
the court hearings took place in the Netherlands and were adjudicated by a Scottish court.42 
Article 6 in the European Convention on Human Rights guarantees everyone a Right to a 
Fair Trial as follows: 
 
1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge 
against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable 
time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be 
pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the 
trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic 
society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the 
parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in 
special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 
  2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until 
proved guilty according to law.  
     3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: 
 a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the 
nature and cause of the accusation against him; 
      b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defense; 
c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if 
he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the 
interests of justice so require; 
 d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance      
and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses  
against him; 
e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the 
language used in court. 
 
                                                
42 On the geographic extent of the Convention, see articles 56 and 59. 
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The procedure in the Netherlands did not fully comply with the requirements set out above.  
The defense was not provided with all the evidence the prosecution had at hand and the 
accused was not given the option of choosing their own legal assistance. The facilities to 
prepare his defense were not provided since the defense was denied access to some of the 
evidence used by the prosecution. 43 
Furthermore, the right to be presumed innocent may also have been 
infringed, since the evidence given by the prosecution seems not have been sufficient for 
proving beyond reasonable doubt that the accused and convicted Al Megrahi was in fact 
guilty. As expressed above, a great deal of the evidence actually seemed conflicting and 
even at best, circumstantial.44 
3.6 The Main Issues of the Lockerbie Case 
 
3.6.1 Questionable Action of the Security Council 
  
  Lately, there has been much discussion of the limitations to the authority of the 
United Nations Security Council. The sanctions targeted against individuals have gained 
much criticism because of the nature of the sanctions comparable to punitive sanctions of 
criminal behavior. However, sanctions appointed directly by the Council are not the only 
issue caused by the lack of judicial review or limitations to the authority of the Council. 
Also its interference in matters not directly threatening to the peace and security may be 
cause for concern. 
  In the Lockerbie case, the situation might have been diplomatically 
challenging, but whether Libya actually caused a threat to the international peace and 
security by refusing to extradite though willing to co-operate in all other possible ways and 
to try the suspects, seems like a relevant question. Granted, the United States and United 
Kingdom might have a reason for suspicions considering the impartiality of the trials in 
Libya, but trying the suspects in a third country had also been brought up as a possibility.  
  Acting through the Security Council to prevent the International Court of 
Justice from actually reviewing the matter under Montreal Convention, was at the very 
least a questionable measure to be taken, which suggests that the United States and the UK 
were aware of the fact that legally they did not have a valid case against Libya in the 
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context of the Montreal Convention. International politics and international law can get 
uncomfortably intertwined, not the least when included in a dispute concerning 
international terrorism and the individuals entangled in the matter may regrettable be those 
who carry the consequences if they are not guaranteed the execution of their fundamental 
rights. 
  Did the political influence of the United States and United Kingdom in the end 
also result in a miscarriage of justice? Was an innocent person convicted? That will most 
probably always remain unknown, but it can be concluded that the process, as it was, did 
not fulfill the necessary requirements of an impartial, fair trial enshrined in human rights 
instruments. Whether Libya and Al-Megrahi were responsible for the attack can never be 
uncovered, because of essential flaws in proceedings of the case. 
 
3.6.2 Human Rights Issues 
 
 
  A person has a right to be presumed innocent, a right to be heard and a right for 
guarantees necessary for his defense. Nevertheless, a court to which one could appeal to 
have the ban lifted and assets freed cannot be appointed when it comes to Security Council 
Resolutions. Since the respect for Human Rights is one of the Purposes and Principles 
mentioned in the United Nations Charter, it seems the Security Council has also failed to 
act in accordance with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations, even having an 
obligation to do so. In the Lockerbie case, the Security Council did not directly affect the 
result of the trial, but its interference had an impact in how the trial was to be arranged.  
  The notions to “national security” and “public safety” should be met with 
reservation when it comes to excusing limitations to human rights on the basis of said 
concepts, as they do not meet the requirements of specificity and definition. Their vague 
nature allows the states or, in the case of the United Nations Security Council, organs of 
international organizations the possibility to limit the execution of human rights on the 
basis of something that might “desirable” rather than “necessary”. 45 
  The problem with having an organ of an international organization hold so 
much power, is the lack of democracy in the its processes and means of controlling the 
fairness of the outcome. There is no rule of law, when the “law” or in this case, treaty is 
too vague to significantly limit the actions of the organ. International law can never be law 
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in the traditional sense, because sovereign states cannot be bound by obligations in a 
similar way as governments in a domestic sphere.46 Getting the international organs to 
respect the obligations the governments are required to comply with is the key factor, but 
without a single instance able to override for example the Security Council resolutions, not 
much can be done to bring back the respect for the rule of law, should the Council decide 
to disregard such limitations. 
  Professor Martti Koskenniemi has argued that international law is not in fact 
law, but merely politics47 and unfortunately, this seems to hold true. The actions of the 
Security Council, as well of the International Court of Justice in the Lockerbie case, 
showed that the reality of the international politics can have a greater impact on the 
outcome in certain situations, despite treaty articles and promises to respect human rights 
or the sovereignty of other states.  
  The Security Council may have been created as an organ to guarantee peace 
and security for the world as a whole, but with the immense and somewhat unlimited 
power it possesses, it can also be used to uphold and promote political agendas of the 
leading nations. It can easily be concluded that usage of the Security Council for furthering 
an individual state’s political agendas is an astounding error in the system that was created 
to protect peace and security in the entire world. Altogether, the design of United Nations 
and the Security Council was always a flawed one, since in the beginning getting the 
Council to act was challenging because of the power politics and the shift in the power 
balance cause a new kind of problem in restricting the actions of the Council. 
  Furthermore, protection of human rights, or at the very least, any guarantee to 
such protection is lacking in the current system. The United Nations Charter vows to 
promote respect for inalienable rights of humans48, but is itself not bound by any existing 
human rights convention or treaty and does earn criticism for that fact. 
 The importance of human rights is paramount, as it is one of the most important 
limitations to individual state governments and parliaments in using their authority over 
their citizens and it should not be possible to supersede these rights by turning to 
international organizations that are not bound by the same commitments. States form the 
membership of the United Nations and if the members are bound by the obligation to 
respect certain fundamental rights, the organization that ties the international community 
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together, should surely not be in the position to disregard such obligations. The lack of 
unity in obligations can reduce the credibility of the existing system. 
  Should the Security Council be appointed a court to perform judicial review 
over its actions? Perhaps, since as it is, the Security Council is too convenient a tool to be 
used to further the interests of certain states – at the expense of others. The Court, having a 
possibility to legitimize the actions of other organs of the UN, should not be taken as a 
hindrance to the effective functioning of those organs49.  
  This might result in disrespect and incompliance of the resolutions50 even when 
the Council is actually performing its original duties in maintaining peace and security, 
which might have disastrous consequences. After all, there was a reason for the creation of 
an organ with the capacity to swift action. The concerns over maintaining the effectiveness 
of the Council and the suitability of the International Court of Justice to provide a 
restriction to the powers of the Council is to be debated further on, in another chapter of 
the thesis.  
4 Authority and Function of the Security Council 
 
4.1 Historical Background of the Creation of the Security Council 
 
The Security Council is one of the most significant organs of the United 
Nations. It was established due to a need of an effective means to operate in case of a 
serious threat to peace and security. The objective was to avoid a new catastrophe such as 
the two World Wars had been. Originally, the Security Council was in several occasions 
unable to perform its duties, due to the tensions between the permanent member states and 
their power of veto. After the Cold War, however, the Security Council has been accused 
of exceeding its powers rather than failing to use them51. 
The predecessor of the Security Council, the League of Nations, was 
miserably unsuccessful in its task to maintain peace and prevent the occurrence of another 
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World War by failing to appeal to the states essentially holding power in the world.52 The 
architects of the United Nations did not want to repeat the mistakes and awarded the 
victors of the Second World War the right to permanent membership in the Security 
Council and the power of veto that it entailed, allowing them to keep the power in their 
hands. The permanent membership of the Council echoed firmly the outcome of the war, 
allocating the privilege to the Allies, the United Nation, United Kingdom, France, Soviet 
Union and China. The purpose was for the great powers to provide a system of checks and 
balances for each other and first the plan worked perhaps too well, virtually incapacitating 
the Security Council altogether. The combined powers of the permanent five were 
expected to have the capability to take effective measures in order to maintain collective 
peace and security in the world.53  
Also the Security Council was designed to give the United Nations an 
effective organ, able to execute the decisions and bind member states to apply them. The 
League of Nations, not having had a similar locus of power, was even more depended on 
the Great Powers, to enforce its decisions, than the United Nations is today.54  
 
4.2 The Basis of the Authority in the United Nations Charter 
 
 The United Nations Charter declares that the member states bestow the 
Security Council with the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace 
and security. The Charter empowers the Council to take action when a threat to the peace 
or a breach of peace occurs. What constitutes a threat to the peace or a breach of peace has 
been left for the Council to determine.55 
The United Nations Charter states a range of sanctions the Security Council has the 
authority to apply, when breach of peace or threat to it has been identified. The range 
includes complete and partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, 
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telegraphic, radio and other means of communication and the severance of diplomatic 
relations56.  
The Security Council resolutions to impose sanctions are legally binding to United 
Nations member states who must implement them. The Security Council, acting under the 
United Nations Charter, holds extensive power, being virtually at liberty to decide when a 
threat to the international peace has occurred and what the appropriate measures to be 
taken are.57 
While paragraph 2 of Article 39 states that the Security Council must apply its  
sanctioning powers in accordance with the United Nations Purposes and Principles, it has 
been argued that the paragraph does not form a specific enough restriction to significantly 
limit the Councils authority. This however, seems to have been intentional, as the founding 
states of the United Nations wanted the Council to be able to act swiftly and effectively 
and drafted the limitations to its powers to a rather flexible form.58  
The sanctions can be applied against single states, multiple states, non-state entities 
and individuals. Lately the Security Council has targeted the sanctions against individuals 
more often, which has also been called a "smart sanctions" policy. Directing the sanctions 
towards individuals who are, or might be, responsible for organizing terrorist movements, 
has been regarded “smart” due to the fact that the targeted sanctions presumably have more 
effect on the people actually responsible for the threat to or breach of peace. The measures 
most suited to target individuals include travel bans and asset freezes. Asset freezes aim to 
prevent the targeted individuals from funding or assisting terrorists or participating in their 
activity.59 
However, as discussed in connection to the Kadi case previously, the human rights 
issues related to allowing an intra-governmental organ to impose sanctions on particular 
individuals is questionable to say the least. The rights of the individual can be very hard to 
guarantee, when the organ deciding on the sanctions has not originally been designed to 
perform judicial functions or to handle appeals.  
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4.3 Development of the Security Council Practise after the Cold War – 
New Functions of the Council 
 
4.3.1 The Security Council as a Judicial Organ 
 
The Security Council has been interpreted to have acted in a quasi-judicial 
ability. Recommendations of the Security Council to settle a dispute between states can 
turn into binding resolutions coercing one of the parties of the dispute to comply with what 
originally was a mere recommendation.60 An example of such judicial action was seen in 
relation to the Lockerbie case, when the United States and United Kingdom succeeded in 
getting the Council to give a resolution prior to the International Court of Justice having an 
opportunity to release their judgment on the case before them. In fact, it could be argued 
that the Security Council stepped in to prevent the International Court of Justice from 
performing a duty assigned to it by the Charter.  
The International Court of Justice, the judicial organ of the United Nations 
was assigned by the Charter to the role of solving treaty interpretation disputes between 
states, not to review the decisions of the political organs of the UN61. Instead of being 
allowed a chance to effectively rule on the interpretation of the Montreal Convention, the 
creative interpretation of the concept of “a threat to the peace” by the Security Council in 
fact solved the dispute by trumping the Montreal Convention by supremacy of Security 
Council Resolutions. 
The engagement of the Security Council in judicial activity escaped criticism 
when the quasi-judicial declarations it made concerned situations where it was considered 
necessary in order to put an end to crises threatening peace. When the Council expanded 
onto establishing sanction against individuals that were for example, suspected of 
involvement in funding international terrorism, the reception was quite different. 62 
The secretary-general got involved by addressing the Security Council with 
specific list of the requirements the necessary human rights guarantees such as the right for 
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a fair process63 impose on the work of the Sanctions Committee and several other instances 
studied the procedures of the Committee with concern. The Security Council did ultimately 
seize on the proposals, but the concerns did not entirely evaporate. The General Court, as 
noted, was not convinced enough had been done to guarantee individuals the protection of 
their fundamental rights and the sanctions were still not permissible for implementation in 
the European Union law.   
 
4.3.2 The Security Council as a Legislator 
 
The legislative actions of the Security Council have also gotten a wary 
response. Whether and when Security Council resolutions constitute legislation, has been 
debated. Technically, since the Security Council produces binding obligations for member 
states without specific consent of those states, the resolutions might all be argued to 
generate new international legislation. However, it has been viewed that only resolutions 
that contain general and abstract obligations, not limited in time and applicable to an 
indefinite number of cases should be considered international legislation.64  
Arguments for the Security Council to be allowed wide discretion in 
determining “a threat to the peace” the key to its powers under Chapter VII of the Charter 
can be based on the rapid development of the circumstances. That is to say, existing forms 
of threat to the peace have escalated and the Security Council needs to be able to interfere 
in threats that might have a variety of different manifestations to fulfil its purpose of 
maintaining peace and security. The abstract nature of the threat should not form an 
obstacle impossible to overcome or the object and purpose of the Security Council will 
become unattainable.65 
It has thus been argued that the generalization of the obligations posed for the 
member states of the United Nations, does not create a situation where the Security 
Council exceeds its authority, since it is uncontested, that it has the authority to establish 
binding obligations of a more particular nature66. Naturally, the need to ensure the efficacy 
of the Council, which has been emphasized throughout, would suffer if the Council was 
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limited to giving resolutions in particular cases at hand and forced to produce new 
resolutions for each manifestation of the same threat, for example international terrorism. 
The defects observed in the Security Council wielding legislative power67 
include the indeterminacy of the resolutions compared to treaty-based legislation. The 
Resolutions have thus been described “more akin to directives than to regulations in 
European Community law”. Due to the compromises made in preparing the resolutions, 
the language used may often be ambiguous and non-specific and states are left with the 
opportunity to apply the resolutions in accordance with their conception of the contents.68 
As noted before, the nature of international law as actual “law” has been 
questioned. This is due to the dichotomous relationship the international law has with one 
of the basic elements it relies on, namely the concept of sovereignty.  The state needs its 
sovereignty to enter into treaties that constitute international law. But if a state is 
sovereign, can it be bound by a treaty, should it wish to be unbound by it? The dilemma 
has led researchers of international law to conclude that international law is, in fact, not 
law at all, but merely international politics. 
 
4.3.3 Failures and Successes 
 
As stated before, the Security Council faced challenges in efficiency during 
the Cold War era. Since then, it has both succeeded and failed in its assignment for 
maintaining peace and security in the world. Most scholars applaud the handling of the 
Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1991, but skeptical evaluation of the reasons behind the success 
has also been presented. The existence or lack of national interest in any upcoming crisis 
will have a great input in the outcome. 69 
 The lack of national interest in the peacekeeping missions of the Council has 
already proved to be a hindrance for the necessary swift and effective responses to threats 
to the peace and security. Even acts of genocide have not proved enough of an incentive 
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for more active involvement of the United Nations through Security Council practice. The 
most alarming failures of the United Nations have been patched up with some more 
creative interpretation of the authority of the Council by the creation of ad hoc tribunals to 
manage the aftermath of the horrors in Rwanda and Yugoslavia.70 
 
4.4 Restricting the Actions of the Security Council 
 
4.4.1 The Need for Defining Restrictions 
 
Since the Security Council took up a more active role after the end of Cold 
War, the extensive authority it can exercise has also given rise to a growing concern 
considering the applicability of any limits to the actions of the Security Council. Possible 
restrictions to the authority of the Council has been sought from human rights, jus cogens, 
general international law, sovereignty of states and the United Nations Charter itself. The 
following is an overview of the different sources of restriction. 
 
4.4.2 The United Nations Charter 
 
The United Nations Charter can be considered the Constitution of the United 
Nations and due to the exceptional nature of the organization that essentially also makes it 
the constitution of the international community. The nature of the Security Council under 
the United Nations is political, but its authority is based on a legal document and should 
therefore be limited by law as well.71  
An expectation that the purposes and principles of the Charter provide a 
limitation to the powers of the Council is plainly logical, since an international organ 
cannot be proven to have powers beyond the source of those powers. In the case of the 
Security Council, the source is the Charter and acting beyond the scope of the Charter 
cannot be acceptable to the international community. The question remains, what the limits 
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to the scope of the Charter are and has the Council, interpreting the concept of “a threat to 
the peace” extended its own authority too far? 
The Charter provides the Council power to take measures to maintain peace 
and security and it has been stated that some quasi-legislative actions might be necessary 
in the fight against the myriad of threats present or following. However, the Charter has 
also been considered a restriction to the power it allocates to the Council, since the implied 
legislative authority is limited to a specific sphere of legislation, namely peace and security 
and the maintenance of that sphere. 72 
The Council cannot be seen fit to create general legislation to fields of 
international law outside its sphere of authority, that is to say, when the matter at hand is 
not directly in correspondence with matters of peace and security. On the contrary, such 
general development of international law has been left to the General Assembly. 73 
The notion of necessity has been encountered in the chapter concerning the 
Kadi case when listing the human rights issues of the sanctions the Council has targeted 
against individuals suspected of funding international terrorism. Proportionality is an 
important aspect, when limiting the execution of human rights and contemplating the 
relationship between two conflicting rights.  
Proportionality has been sought after also in the Security Council practise, 
noting that the Council should refrain from actions that are not strictly necessary or that are 
possible to carry out in another manner, less intrusive of the sovereignty of the member 
states. Council-driven legislation of a general nature might have been necessary when it 
came to the fight against international terrorism, since the usual means of international 
law-making had resulted in a convention not many states were committed to. 74 
What remains questionable in the light of human rights protection in the 
Security Council resolutions 1373 and 1540 is not the general, but the particular nature of 
the legislative character of those resolutions. The creation of the Sanctions Committee and 
the list of persons and entities the sanctions were to be targeted at forced the member states 
to freeze the funds of specific individuals and organizations, without the opportunity to 
investigate, whether the sanctions where rightfully targeted at people involved in funding 
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international terrorism as described by the resolutions due to the binding nature and 
supremacy of the Security Council. 
Arguments to the effect that only gross disproportionality of the object, 
maintenance of peace and security, and the means taken by the Council could lead to the 
Council exceeding its authority are based on the wide discretion the Charter grants the 
Council.75 However, the Charter allowing the Council to determine the proportionality of 
its actions does not eliminate the possibility that the legislation of the Council could be 
perceived illegitimate, if the requirement of proportionality is overlooked. 
The deduction that the Council cannot impose entire treaties on states that are 
not bound by said treaties has been considered another limit to the powers of the Council.76  
This seems more like restriction relating to legislation technique, since the Council can, in 
any case, impose the core obligations of a treaty on a state that has not agreed to it. 
The constitutional character of the United Nations Charter has nonetheless 
been debated too, because unlike constitutions usually do, it only covers certain sectors of 
international law, like protecting international peace and security and is supplemented by 
other treaties, each responsible for regulation of their respective sectors or fields of 
international relations.77 
 
4.4.3 Limits for the Purpose of Protecting Human Rights 
 
Since one of the three categories of the United Nations’ field of operation is human 
rights and humanitarian, human rights earn the privilege to be considered one of the 
restrictions to the powers of the United Nations Security Council. One suggestion contains 
improving the expertise of the Sanctions Committee by replacing diplomats with legal 
specialists who would be better equipped to deal with the legal and humanitarian issues 
connected to imposing sanctions.78 This to me would distantly resemble creating a judicial 
committee to manage the appeals and pleas of the individuals and organizations targeted 
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with the sanctions, the lack of which has been one of the problems emerging from the use 
of “smart sanctions”.  
The reluctance of governments to include human rights clauses into international 
treaties is connected to the fact that the national human rights obligations might prove 
difficult to merge with the international ones due to the diversity of human rights standards 
around the world.79 Despite the fact that human rights are not a concept free from reasons 
for criticism and should not be deemed unproblematic and morally harmonius, especially 
in a fundamentalist or formalist manifestation, it is a concept that allows a powerful set of 
arguments for the promotion of freedom. This is considered to be caused by the nature of 
rights as both universal and particular.80 
The promotion of human rights in for example economic integration treaties has 
been considered especially beneficial to the less developed countries, allowing the 
individuals more room for self-development, when the fair distribution of goods and 
opportunities is globally regulated. It has even been stated that the democratic legitimacy 
of the treaties derives from the promotion of respect for human rights,81 which can perhaps 
be applied to establishing legitimacy for a fundamentally undemocratic organ such as the 
Security Council. 
Erika De Wet has observed the constitutionalization of the international law 
in her article. Despite the fact that she does not consider the United Nations Charter a 
constitution she calls for recognition and execution of norms based on common values 
such as fundamental human rights. She also introduces an idea of a layered reality of 
international value system, where norms are either jus cogens, have gained the status of 
erga omnes instead of just being based on an idea of bundles of bilateral obligations or are 
norms which do not yet have the status of erga omnes or peremptory norms but are gaining 
wide recognition.82 
De Wet questions the significance of democracy as a guarantee of legitimacy 
and finds proof by comparing the constitutions around the world to the peremptory or erga 
omnes norms of the international sphere and concluding that a great deal of similarities can 
be detected. She also analyses the roles of the national and international courts and 
tribunals in protecting and maintaining what she calls the ”common values” in the world 
and in providing a check for powers of the supra-national organs such as the United 
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Nations Security Council. Allowing the national courts to examine the legality of the 
Security Council resolutions may cause the supremacy of the resolutions to suffer and 
decrease the efficacy of the Council. 83 
Development back towards national hegemony and creating distance to the 
idea of common values of mankind has caused concern. The return to an international 
society were decision-making occurs exclusively within nation-states without an agreed 
ground of common values, might put the rights of the individuals in danger.84   
Human rights can prove an invaluable asset in promoting common values. 
The human rights that have caused much discussion through their conflicts with Security 
Council resolutions are portrayed in more detail in Chapter 2 of the thesis. 
 
4.4.5 Judicial Review of the Security Council – The Relationship with the 
International Court of Justice 
 
The problem with the Security Council imposed sanctions is not just the fact that 
some of them do not always meet the requirements set forth by the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights and other fundamental rights obligations, but also that there is no judicial 
organ competent to coerce the Security Council to change its procedures or to reverse the 
sanctions. As noted in a previous section, instead of being under the jurisdiction of the 
International Court of Justice, the Security Council has even taken action to interfere in 
proceedings before the Court.85 
Earlier, when drafting the United Nations Charter, it was suggested that the 
International Court of Justice should be competent to review the action taken by the 
Security Council, but as the purpose of establishing the Security Council was to create an 
organ that would be able to act swiftly when necessary, the states decided not to limit the 
Security Council’s authority by obligating it to answer to the International Court of Justice. 
In theory, this gave the Council virtually unlimited power.86  
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The International Court of Justice might receive an opportunity to give an 
advisory opinion on the limits to the authority of the Security Council, if two thirds of the 
General Assembly agree to request one. Gross disregard of possible authority issues by the 
Council could lead to the International Court of Justice declaring action of the Security 
Council ultra vires. Regardless of the advisory nature of such declaration, this would no 
doubt be a result the Council would wish to avoid. The compliance pull of the resolution 
would surely decrease notably if the Court found it in conflict with the Charter.87 Again, it 
is essentially in the hands of the General Assembly to choose to resort to these measures. 
Applying such pattern of control would return the power to the “parliament of the United” 
Nations, which might relieve the democratic deficit of the international law by allowing 
the non-members of the Security Council more influence.  
The practical difficulties in assigning such power to the Court might prove 
overwhelming though. The general jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice is not 
accepted without provisions even in the current circumstances. How the permanent 
member states of the Security Council would react to extending the Court’s jurisdiction is 
undetermined. The notion of utilizing the “uniting for peace” conception as more of an 
incentive for the Council to carry out its duties accordingly rather than actively applying 
such an innovative measure might gain more success in practise. 
The International Court of Justice never ruled on the merits of the Lockerbie 
case, because the parties of the dispute withdrew the case. Whether the International Court 
of Justice could have taken up the authority to annul Council legislation, remained thus 
unanswered88. However, admitting the supremacy of the Council resolution when handling 
the provisional measures implied that the Montreal Convention would not have been 
applicable after the Council had obligated Libya to provide the mentioned “full an 
effective response” to the demands of the United States and United Kingdom.  
The relationship between the Court and Council has been described through 
the differences in the nature of the organizations; the Court having been appointed the 
legal function of the United Nations and the Council the political.89 As has been described 
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in this thesis, though, the functions of the Council are not merely political in nature, but it 
has been argued to have acquired legislative and judicial capacities as well. The measures 
the Security Council can take on behalf of the United Nations to preserve peace have been 
considered legal sanctions for threatening the peace, but the absence of a condition for the 
Security Council to apply the sanctions only in cases of breach of international law can 
defeat the comparison. 90 
The International Court of Justice may have been considered unsuitable to review 
the Council’s decisions due to their political nature. However, if the ICJ is considered the 
supreme judicial organ, which should not be considered sufficient grounds for extension of 
the ICJ competence over the matters left for the Council to determine, should it not then at 
least have the power to review the resolutions of the Council, when the Council is 
effectively acting in a quasi-judicial role? 
 
4.4.5. Other Sources of Restrictions 
 
 For example in the Lockerbie case, a multitude of concepts would have 
spoken for a different outcome. The sovereignty of states provides states the right to 
assume that their international relations will be governed according to their treaty 
commitments. Democracy has been viewed as a prerequisite for legitimacy of national 
governments. Traditional concept of democracy is unfortunately ill suited to provide 
legitimacy for international government, at least when the obligations imposed on the 
states are not ones that the national government has directly agreed to91. 
The obligations the Security Council Resolutions under the Chapter VII can 
impose on states are not depended on express approval of the national governments but 
rather; take supremacy over all other obligations the states may have committed to 
willingly. It has been argued that the consent of the states to be bound by the United 
Nations Charter does not suffice to qualify the decision making of the Council 
democratic.92 
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The problematic behind the idea of democracy as an indicator of legitimacy, 
and how poorly the concept of democracy fits the international sphere of activity should be 
pointed out. While state consent continues to be the most important indicator of legitimacy 
of international legal instruments, the world should pursue a different solution to managing 
co-operation of states in order to create an effective means for battling the common 
problems of mankind.93 
5 Future Developments and the New World Order? 
 
 
5.1 Current World Order and the Security Council? 
 
 
Kanthian theory on the creation of a world government describes its 
occurrence connected to a catastrophe that would bring the world together to act 
“rationally” in an extreme situation. It has been stated, that it cannot be known what would 
actually happen in such a post-catastrophic situation.  However, we have seen the creation 
of the most extensive international organization yet arise from the ashes of a devastating 
intercontinental war that left behind both direct victims of the war and victims of a 
genocide.94 
Next catastrophe to inspire the sovereign states to release some of their 
domestic authority to global actors can very well be environmental rather than military. 
The reliability and legitimacy of the international organizations, such as the United Nations 
and the executive organ, like the Council needs to be increased by allowing the subjects to 
affect the decisions of the decision makers more – that is, to incorporate democracy into 
the process.95 
While several options from Marxist global proletariat to a world without 
international relations have been presented to rival the existing order, it has also been 
thoroughly argued that any drastic enough changes that would lead to the demise of the 
state system are not probable in the foreseeable future. On the contrary, the state system is 
mostly accepted as the inevitable base to any possible changes in the political environment 
of the world.  
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It is highly unlikely though, that any of the great states would give up their 
status as super powers, in order to allow the formation of a global government. It can be 
seen clearly enough in the reluctance of the United States to sign away the right to 
prosecute their own citizens, even when charged of an international crime such as 
genocide, in favour of the International Criminal Court . Environmental treaties, like the 
Kioto Convention have not gained much more success. In general, the European countries 
have been more willing to tie themselves to the global rules of an international society, 
while the Americans are more in favour of a unilateral take on the world.96 
Regionalists see the current state system as just a one of the stages of 
development of the state system and regional joint states as the tendency of the future. 
Although some regionalists have even gone far enough to create a division of states into 
regional interest groups, because the possibility of superpower-lead world politics is seen 
as a threat to the interests of the Third-World countries.97 
The concern is that international politics lead solely by the great powers 
would increase the unjust nature of the world order and not allow some parts of the world 
any influence on the development. But regionalism can be criticized by pointing out that 
even regional rule would put some of the states in to an unfavourable situation, where the 
most influential state of the region would take over regulation of the internal affairs.98  
Some are also afraid that when international relations are handled through 
government networks more so than within international organisations, the weaker states 
lose ground to the stronger great powers, because government networks are not as visible 
and are therefore harder to keep track of.  Governments of influential states may have even 
more possibilities to dictate the direction of joint global actions. This is also one of the key 
issues of extensive authority the Security Council wields along with the human rights 
concerns.99 
5.2 Sovereignty as a Prerequisite of International Law 
 
Sovereignty has been claimed to have lost its “resonance” as a defensive 
shield against the interference of other states to domestic affairs. Despite the objections of 
states, the norm of sovereignty does not extend quite as wide anymore.  Human rights and 
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other global values have stepped on the toes of sovereign states even where there is no 
competent international organ to monitor respect for them. 100 
The Security Council, with the powers it has been allowed by the Chapter 
VII of the United Nations Charter, intrudes upon the sovereignty of the states by virtue of 
the sovereign states having accepted the Charter willingly. Monitoring of the Security 
Council, that is, of the governments of the member states, has not yet been organized to 
match the trend in increasing demand of respect for human rights. Nonetheless, the 
resolutions mentioned earlier have raised arguments showing concern for the lack of 
human rights guarantees in the Security Council resolution process. 
A very central problem in all international law is culminated in the concept of 
sovereignty and convincing states to commit to treaties without too many provisions, 
especially when common interests like environmental issues are at stake. After all, what 
good is a treaty, if all the states involved have made an endless array of provisions to its 
application or if the states involved do commit to applying the treaty without provisions, 
but only a few states take part in it? Keeping super powers such as the United States 
involved in the United Nations, but trying to get them to agree to and abide by common 
standards and rules seems to be the ever-present challenge of the international community. 
 
5.3 Inspiration from the Regionalist Approach 
 
Laurent Cohen-Tanugi describes the influence of European Union as a sort of 
“soft power” while the United States have felt the need to resort to the use of “hard 
power”, that is military force, to attain their influence.  Also Ian Kerns and Glenn Hook 
refer to “soft” and “hard” aspects, but in terms of regional co-operation. They see the 
“soft” approach as more connected to regional co-operation on a more social level.  Within 
European Union the cultural and social similarities have been enhanced when there has 
been an aim to promote a sense of “natural unity”.101 
Regional approach can also help balance the influencing power struggle 
between smaller states and superpowers. If smaller states form regional “alliances” or new 
federal states, their combined influence would be far greater than any of the states could 
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amount to on their own. Was the European Union not partly designed to create a balancing 
power in response to the dominance of the United States in world politics since the 
downfall of the Soviet Union? 
European Union has promoted regionalism, but also globalisation in the 
sense that the European states have been willing to give up their sovereignty to some 
extent to form a new union. The achievements of the European Union have been 
overlooked though, claiming, that “the European bubble” of peace and safety is actually 
provided by the military force of the United States. 102  
The fact that the International Court of Justice refused to grant Libya 
provisional measures to ensure its right to refuse to extradite its citizens due to the Security 
Council resolution on the matter clearly indicates that the Court, given the opportunity or 
left the obligation to rule on the merits of the case, would not have been willing to override 
a decision of the Security Council. According to the Charter, the Court is not entitled to 
assess whether Security Council resolutions are consistent with the Charter. Possibly a 
change in the relationship of the Security Council and International Court of Justice would 
be called for if there were a change in the status of United Nations in terms of human 
rights obligations.  
In an article published in the American Journal of International Law, Eric 
Stein goes over the development of European Community law through the jurisprudence of 
the Court of Justice of the European Communities. He states that the difference between 
most international treaties and the European Community Treaties was actually created or at 
least heavily enforced by the Court. Without the Court’s decisiveness in making the 
member states abide by the treaty and interpreting the treaty “in the spirit” of it, he argues 
the treaty would have been just as any other international treaty instead of creating a quasi-
federal community of states. 103 
Stein analyses the development with a special interest on how the states, the 
Council, the Commission, the Advocate General and the Court formed their opinions on 
the cases that were brought to the Court and notes that most often states have opposed the 
development towards more effective emphasis on the Community legislature and 
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Commission has been more likely to support it. National governments, however, tend to 
oppose changes that emphasize international legislation.104 
Stein also finds that the defining moments of the development included the 
introduction of “direct effect”, “supremacy” the move from “horizontal to vertical effect” 
and the change from the mere effect of negative obligations to also enforcing positive 
obligations, which were all brought about by the Court of Justice of the European 
Communities. By creating a judicial body, the member states took their treaty to another 
level compared to most existing international treaties. The effect of the treaty would have 
been far less intrusive on the national legal orders without the enforcement of Community 
legislature by the Court – even when the states were unwilling to abide by their 
obligations.105 
The European Court of Justice took the liberty of reviewing the execution of human 
rights standards in European Community legislation even before the Treaty establishing 
the European Economic Communities included any notion of human rights to be respected. 
Originally the Treaty did not refer to human rights protection. The Court based its actions 
on the common constitutional traditions of the member states and on the European 
Convention of Human Rights, despite the fact that the Communities were not bound by the 
Convention. This emphasis on human rights constructed by judicial activism was mostly 
welcomed by writers.106 Actually, before the European Communities grew from a treaty 
with its emphasis on the economic aspects, to a Union with a bill of rights of its own, the 
adoption of human rights was called after as the “core policy” of the organization.107 
The judicial review the European Court of Justice took to performing even 
interfered with the right of the national constitutional courts to review the compatibility of 
the Community legislation with the national constitution, which was not accepted by the 
constitutional courts of Germany and Italy.108 Naturally, to confirm that all member states 
would apply Community legislation uniformly, claiming the exclusive right to evaluate the 
conformity of the Community legislation with the human rights standards of the 
constitutional traditions of the member states was absolutely necessary.  
Achieving similar uniformity to the application of Security Council Resolutions, a 
corresponding take on the protection of human rights might silence some of the critics of 
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the Council, considering how well the activism was received. If the International Court of 
Justice claimed the authority of reviewing the conformity of the resolutions with the 
necessary human rights guarantees. After all, as has been presented, a great deal of the 
criticism and even incompliance of the Council actions has to do with concerns regarding 
the execution of human rights. 
The entry of the United Nations into a binding human rights convention might even 
become somewhat unnecessary if protection of the rights was covered through what might 
be called judicial creativity. The European Union did eventually get a bill of rights 
included in the constitutional treaty109 and the legal personality allowing it the capacity to 
enter into the European Convention of Human Rights.  
Writers have been considered to disagree whether the accession of the EU to the 
Convention was necessary or if the protection of human rights had already reached a 
sufficient degree within the scope of European Union through the judicial practice of the 
European Court of Justice.110 This suggests that the basis of the protection is not always 
found as relevant as the practical manifestation. 
However, in my view legal certainty may be better served through a more firm 
legal basis, namely including the United Nations in a binding instrument of human rights. 
The common constitutional tradition that the European Court of Justice leaned on is much 
more difficult to define in a global setting and in any case judicial activism can backfire 
and eventually defeat the original intentions of strengthening the human rights safeguard. 
 A likely benefit of the allowing the International Court of Justice the authority to 
review the Council resolutions exclusively for the protection of human rights would be the 
limited amount of strain put on the effectiveness of the Council. However, the option 
might be wise to avoid rather than to rush into using. As stated, the knowledge of the 
possibility that the General Assembly might lean on the Court to might be enough of an 
incentive for the Security Council to pay more attention to the possible human rights issues 
of its resolutions. 
The Court would perhaps require more creativity than can be accepted to adopt 
teleological interpretation style utilized by the European Court of Justice to allow itself to 
rule on the possible human rights issues of the Security Council resolutions. However, the 
purpose of the drafters of the Charter cannot have been to allow the Council to strip 
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individuals of their rights without regard to proportionality or necessity, especially 
considering the atmosphere of the post-world-war-era, when the horrors of the Nazi regime 
were revealed in full. Hope for the United Nations (and its Security Council) to be able to 
maintain peace is expressed in connection to reaffirming “the dignity and worth of the 
human person.”111  
6 Challenges and Suggestions – The Future of the Security 
Council 
 
6.1 Inclusion and Openness  
 
In his article written for the American Journal of International Law, Ian 
Johnstone has viewed the problems in Security Council acquiring roles of both a quasi-
judicial and a quasi-legislative organ in addition to being an intra-governmental organ, the 
primary function of which was to enable the representatives of the most powerful nations 
to have a more effective environment for reaching consensus to avoid conflicts such as the 
two World Wars, than what the heavier, more inflexible machinery of the General 
Assembly provided them. In the two cases presented in this thesis, the Council has acted in 
both roles, using its authority to override principles of international law and treaty 
obligations – for the political gain of some of the permanent members more than anything 
else? It could possibly be argued, of course, that keeping the permanent members of the 
Security Council satisfied does entail avoiding global conflicts such as a new World War 
would be. 
Johnstone analyses the quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial functions of the 
Security Council and stresses that improving the quality of deliberation is especially 
necessary in connection to these branches of the powers of the Security Council and 
possibly even inapplicable to the traditional “crisis management” task. He assesses in 
particular the Resolutions 1373, 1540 and 1267. Johnstone also goes through the criticism 
that has been targeted towards Security Council “branching out” to legislative and judicial 
functions.  
He presents three different strategies for improving the legitimacy of Security 
Council decisions, namely inclusive consultation, public justification and independent 
review. He finds the idea of global democracy unrealistic, but views that that does not 
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mean the benefits of democratic deliberation are unattainable, since making the 
undemocratic international organs justify their claims in a public debate, allows the public 
a chance to evaluate the legitimacy of the claims and decisions then based on them.  
He states that if an organization should be effective, it is also important for its 
actions to be perceived as legitimate. He presents the theory of Jürgen Habermas as the 
setting of the value of deliberative democracy as it proves that there is value in an open 
discourse where the better arguments prevail and the goal is to justify one’s opinions in a 
credible way. Johnstone also seems to feel that what is important is not necessarily to 
assure the others that one is right but that at least are good reasons behind their views.  
In his article, Johnstone talks about deliberation, communication and 
improving the argumentation of states and international organs when making decisions that 
affect all. He states that well-crafted arguments and the maintaining a certain quality in the 
deliberation is useful for the powerful states as well as for the less influential nations 
operating on the international field.  
Making the opposing side believe that one’s arguments are well-founded, 
even if they do not agree with what the resulting proposal is, makes them more likely to 
comply with the resulting decisions of the more influential states rather than questioning 
their authority to make those decisions. Especially on the international level, since states 
are sovereign and cannot be obligated to enter into treaties, it is of fundamental importance 
to assure the other states that one’s opinion or goal is legitimate and well founded.  
Pressure to comply might be applied against a few states, but it is impossible 
or at least too costly to force general compliance and for this reason improving the 
perceived legitimacy of the decisions is important. The effectiveness of the Security 
Council might suffer from an increase in deliberative practises, but the effectiveness 
created by the willingness of the member states to implement and execute the decisions 
should not be overlooked either. 
In the current international political situation, it seems that everything must 
be done at the terms of the superpowers, as even the United Nations Charter was 
formulated on an assumption that peace could be maintained best in a process uniting the 
powerful states of the Security Council. The unjustness the power politics uphold towards 
the third world countries has not changed. The setting has received much justified criticism 
towards western countries that are urged to learn to share global power with the non-
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democratic “developing countries” and to adjust their views on the juxtaposition of the 
western states and the rest of the world.112 
The power of veto was designed to be used in matters where pressing 
national interests where in question, to involve the great powers in the United Nations by 
allowing them a special privilege in the decision-making.  The power of veto is thus not 
always used accordingly, but exploited also in matters far more unimportant, such as 
procedural questions.113  
Decreasing the use of veto would allow the non-permanent members more 
influence, which might enable a wider involvement of the general membership thus 
increasing the level of democracy of the Security Council actions. As has been noted 
before, democracy, in turn, is still strongly considered one of the indicators of legitimacy. 
The key problem seems to be, that the very factor, namely power-state influence, 
that is keeping the Security Council from performing its peacekeeping function effectively 
and with sufficient neutrality, is also the factor allowing it the credibility its predecessor 
lacked. Solution to the problem should for that reason not be sought in changing the 
Charter all the make-up of the Council altogether. 
The role of the non-members of the Council is debatable. On one hand, their 
approval is sought after by the permanent members. The lack of power of veto does, 
however, tilt the balance of influences notably. The eroding support of the Kadi resolutions 
mentioned earlier is considered a sign that even when passed unanimously, the resolutions 
might not truly be backed by the general opinion. 114 
Legal changes, restricting the actions of the Security Council distinctively 
and therefore restricting the sphere of discretion of the permanent members, might cause a 
rift between for example the United States and the United Nations. The credibility of the 
institution would naturally suffer from such rift. Changes of a more political, diplomatic 
nature would perhaps be more easily welcomed. Even explicitly widening the jurisdiction 
of ICJ might cause the United States to not so much as attempt to seek legitimation to its 
urges, since it has taken critically to the general jurisdiction of the ICJ. 
Johnstone has taken this into account by merely suggesting the proceedings 
of the Security Council should be modified to allow a more open, inclusive debate on the 
matters at hand. Instead of changing the decision-making of the Security Council 
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altogether or limiting its authority, Johnstone proposes increasing the opportunities of non-
members of the Council to voice their opinions and raise their concerns earlier on, before 
the resolutions are given.115 
It has been argued that even non-binding treaties do have a certain 
compliance pull on states, even if it is not as strong as binding treaties carry. That has been 
estimated to have a connection to the value states give to their reputations.116  
Now, the key that still gives the permanent five members of the Security 
Council incentive to try and persuade others to agree to their actions, namely to seek the 
Security Council’s blessing in the form of a resolution, before acting on the urges their 
national interests generate, could very well be the attempt to maintain a perception of 
legitimacy for their actions. It is not unheard of that states make a great deal of effort in 
making the unlawful decisions and actions seem perfectly legitimate. For example, when 
the National Socialistic party was in control of Germany, the laws to create ethnic 
discrimination were carefully constructed so as to assume a perception of legality in hope 
of achieving legitimacy in the process.117 
What should not be forgotten is that even within a nation state, those who 
hold the authority to enact laws, also have the authority to change them. Human rights and 
certain other paragraphs have been deemed so inalienable, that changing them has been 
made more difficult. There are often requirements of vast majorities and time restraints 
such as waiting periods for passing the laws. No written law exists that can in no way be 
changed, as texts are always interchangeable. What I would imagine can keep states from 
interfering with human rights as a part of their constitution, are their international 
obligations.  
As noted before, during the Cold War the Security Council was criticized for 
its inability to act in its peacekeeping capacity due to the collision of superpowers and their 
power of veto, but since then it has sometimes been criticized even more for acting when 
no objectively verifiable threat to the peace was involved, like seems to have been the 
situation with the Lockerbie case. That is, unless a unilateral act of aggression by the 
United States or the United Kingdom was the threat to the peace the Council attempted to 
avoid, in which case the means to achieve that goal can at the very least be described 
controversial. 
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When the United States has not been able to persuade the Security Council to 
act according to its urges, it has instead resorted to unilateral acts118. The United States is 
of course protected by its veto power from ever having its actions officially proclaimed 
illegal or illegitimate. This does provide a credibility issue for the Security Council. During 
the Cold War, when the Security Council was rendered incapable to fulfil its duty of 
preserving peace, the General Assembly stepped in to fill the void in the structure of the 
United Nations, with the “Uniting For Peace Resolution”. It can be debated whether such 
creativity can be utilized in other situations as well, to substitute for the Security Council 
or even override a Council resolution. Substitution of the Security Council by the action of 
the General Assembly may be appropriate in situations where protection of human rights is 
at risk due to the inactivity of the Council.119  
However, since inactivity of the Security Council may not be the only 
obstacle in the way of ensuring protection for human rights but the activity of the Council 
may also threaten the execution of those rights, turning to the General Assembly for 
support might not prove an effective way to defend fundamental rights. The Security 
Council was designed for swift action, whereas the General Assembly represents a more 
traditional approach to international law making and needs the support of a larger part of 
the membership to take measures.  
As it was noted before in the thesis, the United Nations itself, as an 
international organization, is not bound by any human rights treaty or convention and the 
human rights instruments that have been created under the guidance of it120, have been left 
without binding force. The General Assembly, “Uniting for the Protection of Human 
Rights” is therefore an idea hard to justify, especially if it would require the General 
Assembly to annul decisions of the Security Council. Again, international law is generally 
not a field of law prone to swift and dramatic action, but rather, changes in the procedures 
that were once created may be hard to accomplish. 
Giving the International Court of Justice the power to overrule decisions of 
the Security Council to strengthen the protection of human rights and prevent any ultra 
vires action of the Council has also been suggested121. Having reviewed the encouraging 
results in the development of the human rights protection in Europe after submitting the 
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actions of national authorities to the scrutiny of a specially appointed judicature, the 
proposal seems appealing.  
6.2 The Future of the Security Council 
 
6.2.1 Expectations 
 
 The Security Council will constantly be facing new challenges and 
maintaining, or perhaps even restoring, a perception of legitimacy towards its actions will 
not be the least of them. While attempting to avoid tension with human rights and catering 
to the interests of the great power states enough to ensure their involvement in the United 
Nations and answering the demands of the third world countries by developing more open-
natured procedures of decision making to allow them more influence in the international 
society in order to break down the unjust distribution of power in world politics, the 
Security Council will need to find a way to balance the interests and ambitions of the 
governing and the governed. 
 The Security Council has been expected to bring about the “New World 
Order” before and in my view, it still has the best means to do it, due to the enormous 
powers it was entrusted with when the Charter was crafted. Unfortunately, like no 
international organization or an organ of one, it cannot succeed without the support of the 
states holding in together. Restricting the actions of the Council will need to happen in 
order to prevent the power from being gathered to the hands of a few powerful states even 
more than is inevitable, all the while still allowing the Council enough power to even 
strengthen its ability to perform its peacekeeping duties.  
While it has been mostly been accepted  that the concept of sovereign 
statehood is an essential element and building block on the international community as it is 
and that is not likely recede to be replaced by a world government, the Security Council 
has probably come the furthest on the road leading to global governance. It has been 
argued that by relinquishing the responsibility to sustain common security to the Security 
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Council, states have renounced a key part of their sovereignty, since defending peace and 
security is a vital purpose of governance.122 
It has been estimated that increasing the democracy, accountability and 
representativeness of the Council would make the Council less effective in its 
peacekeeping ability123. The Council has faced problems with its efficiency even now, 
when faced with situation where the national interests of the Council member states where 
not at stake, like Rwanda and Yugoslavia. It has been questioned, whether the Council as it 
is, would handle similar situations any more effectively in the future.124  
While it can be agreed that taking the power of veto off of the hands of the 
permanent members is not a realistic option, limits to using that power might be possible to 
achieve, since it was originally in fact introduced to allow the permanent members to 
protect their “vital national interests.” The application of the power of veto has for example 
been excluded when merely procedural matters are in question. 125 However, more 
attention might need to be paid to such exclusions on the concept of the power of veto, 
since the procedural matters have not in fact been protected from interference of the 
permanent members with their privilege.126 
6.2.2 Debating the Options for the Development of the Security Council 
 
Changing the Charter in order to reign in the power of the Security Council 
might prove an impossible task. Even when the Charter was originally formulated, the 
process was not straightforward and simple at best, but involved a lot of negotiations and 
compromising, in order to succeed in creating an organization following in the footsteps of 
the League of Nations but managing to avoid the issues that had caused the failure of the 
League. The Charter was, though, created – undoubtedly assisted by the atmosphere the 
Second World War and the knowledge of the tremendous victim count had caused.  Would 
states still be willing to allow the Council essentially the same powers only introducing a 
counterweight to the balance by giving the International Court of Justice rule over the 
Council in limited situations? What would those limited situations be? Would the whole 
process of changing the Charter just open a can of worms, that is, create a lengthy an futile 
                                                
122 Hossain, 2007 p.81 
123 Hossain, 2007 p. 322 
124Mahbubani, Kishore: The 16 Singapore Law Review Lecture Does The United Nations Security Council Enhance 
or Undermine International Law? Singapore Law Review 2003, volume 23 p. 41-42 
125 Hossain, 2007 p 324-326 
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string of negotiations, with several states trying to include their proposals for changes in 
the discussions.  
It has been argued that since the Cold War ended and substantial changed the 
internal politics of the Council, the power held by the United States has been unmatched 
by any other. During the Cold War, a sort of a system of “checks and balances” had been 
in play with the Soviet Union providing the counterweight to the United States. The lack 
counterweight is exactly what leaves the powers of the Security Council vulnerable to 
abuse and opens up arguments 
The Court of the European Communities is for a large part the instance to 
thank for the importance of the norms of the Union today (previously the European 
Communities) and essentially how the European Union became an institution very 
different from those usually created by international treaties. Without the creation of the 
Court, the status of the legal obligations of the Union would have been very different. 
During the first decades of the European Communities, when the domestic politics and 
unwillingness of states to be bound by foreign, international legal norms threatened the 
purpose of the treaties of the Communities, the Court resorted to teleological 
interpretations of the treaties, in order to strengthen the status of those norms and realize 
the set goals of the Communities. Could a similar interpretive method be applied to the 
United Nations Charter?  
It has been enshrined in the Charter, that one of the purposes and principles 
of the United Nations is promoting human rights. Applying this notion to practise  
Limitations and balance acquired by creating a situation where any 
arguments have to be accepted by several instances that have no direct interest in the 
outcome of that particular case at hand. The notion of impartiality is not one without 
controversies, perhaps especially in international politics, but  
Getting the acceptance of those whose own interests are not at play in any 
other sense than that of reaching the acceptance of others in their future issues, should 
amount to being able to call the arguments somewhat legitimate – at least more so, than in 
situations where no such argumentation is necessary due to the power held by the actor. 
The Security Council can impose obligations on states due to their acceptance of the 
United Nations Charter without particular acceptance of the resolution in question. No 
check to the power of Security Council is present in the current situation. 
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Although human rights as an institution can and should also be criticized and 
not taken as a concept free of political value judgments127, the dual nature of rights seems 
to offer a way to free rights from being merely an apology for any existing order or regime. 
Rights are applied and preserved on domestic fields and may sometimes form an argument 
against the application or execution of an international treaty or committing to one.128  
However, should a sovereign state disregard the rights also portrayed in 
treaties and conventions the state has bound itself to, rights allow the international 
community – particularly those also bound by said treaty – a set of arguments in criticizing 
the actions of the state in breach of its treaty obligations. Though respect for the 
sovereignty of the state might make the international community refrain from acting to 
actually prevent the state in breach of human rights obligations, it has been argued that 
being considered in breach of treaty obligations is not something states take lightly in 
general.129 
Could it be stated that the duality of human rights norms provides a ground 
for them to be protected either through domestic constitutions or international treaties, that 
is, through states attempting to abide by international norms they have agreed to respect? 
Should the need arise, states could then possibly refrain from carrying out their duties 
derived from international treaties130 and on the other hand, arguments based on the need 
to protect human rights might be a tool for the international community to take action 
against a state in breach of said rights. This way, the protection of rights is guarded by two 
instances, both inside and outside sovereign nation states.  
With that said, the political nature of rights can cause the monitoring function 
to lead to confusion and even abuse of the human rights doctrine. Who is it left to decide 
when a state is in breach of human rights treaty obligations enough to allow interference on 
its sovereignty or when applying an international treaty would lead the state to act against 
its own constitution? Balancing out different interests and deciphering the legitimacy of 
norms or arguments is undoubtedly an infinite challenge of both international and domestic 
fields of law.  
                                                
127 Koskenniemi, Martti, Human Rights, Politics and Love, Mennesker & Rettigheter, Issue 4/2001, 2001 
p.40-44 
128 See, incompliance with Security Council Resolutions in connection to the Kadi case, chapter 2 of the 
thesis. 
129 Guzman, 2005 p. 580-583 
130 This refers mainly to possibly disregarding the supremacy of Security Council resolutions if the 
implementation of that particular resolution would result in a human rights violation. 
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One suggestion that has been presented as a possible albeit possibly only 
partial solution consists of adding emphasis on argumentation and deliberation as a form of 
legitimization and allowing the non-Council members access to the debate and the 
formulation of the resolutions by making the deliberative process more open. Bringing 
down what has been called the “deliberative deficit” is portrayed as a possibility in 
increasing respect and trust the Security Council.131  
The Kadi case also poses an intriguing dilemma to the Member States of the 
European Union. If the common heritage of human rights in the domestic constitutions of 
the European Union members and the human rights obligations of the European Union 
prevent the Union from implementing the sanctions set forth by a Security Council 
Resolution Under Chapter 7 of the United Nations Charter, how is it then, that the member 
states themselves would not be in breach of their treaty obligations under European Union 
law? The European Court of Justice, denying it had the competence to evaluate the legality 
of the Security Council resolutions, but still declaring the implementing measures had to 
be annulled, left the member states in a difficult position. 
There are dangers in allowing an international court the jurisdiction that includes 
the monitoring of human rights standards exclusively. For example, in the European 
context, if the national courts are no longer allowed to evaluate the protection of the rights 
enshrined in their national constitutions guarding the execution of those rights are left to an 
organ also responsible for guarding the benefit of the European Union and the 
development of the legislation. It is pointed out that a fundamental right of an individual 
might still end up overlooked when pitted against furthering a common goal of the 
Union.132 Protecting human rights in the context of the United Nations should thus not be 
left exclusively to the International Court of Justice. 
The European Community has been used as an example of how something that 
started as an economic integration treaty evolved into a treaty with a constitutional nature – 
a treaty that now puts a relatively great emphasis on the protection and realization of 
fundamental human rights.133 The European development may very well constitute a 
source of inspiration in the discussion of the future of the United Nations. 
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The imperative lesson is to find a balance between all the aspects regarding 
the Security Council as world government in the field of peace and security. The 
effectiveness of the Council in performing its duties, the credibility it is provided with by 
the military power of the Council members on one hand, the legitimacy, proportionality 
and clarity on the other. Restricting the actions of the Security Council to protect the 
sovereignty of states and fundamental rights of individuals while allowing it enough power 
to act effectively in preserving both human rights and international peace seems to be the 
core of the challenge. 
7 Conclusions 
 
 
 The United Nations Charter was crafted with the intention of avoiding the 
mistakes of the League of Nations. The fatal flaw of the League of Nations was considered 
the fact that its design resulted in the great powers abandoning it, leaving it vulnerable and 
powerless. The power of veto and permanent membership of the winners of the Second 
World War has allowed to the United Nations and the Security Council along it to stay in 
existence and act, more or less, effectively in the peacekeeping ability they were intended 
for.  
After the Cold War, the Council has been far more active and far more able 
to actually perform its peacekeeping duties. However, there have been failures and the 
whole concept of the Council has been questioned – not to mention the composition of it. 
After all, the Council is first and foremost a political organ. The power it holds can – and 
regretfully has been – used to benefit the permanent members instead of truly preserving 
peace in the world. Changing the Security Council has been deemed virtually impossible, 
but it should be noted that changing situations in the power politics in the world can 
require the Council, and especially the permanent five members to take the opinions of the 
non-member states (of the Council) into account if they wish to promote a perception of 
legitimacy of the Council resolutions. 
The situation and the political climate of the world have changed a great deal 
after the creation of the United Nations and the Security Council. The system of permanent 
membership and especially the selection of states that have been awarded the honor to hold 
such authority, have gained much criticism. The greatest, most powerful states might no 
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longer be the five that hold permanent membership of the Security Council and are 
therefore entitled to the power of veto, when not in agreement with the resolution about to 
be made.  There have been suggestions of changing the United Nations Charter to that end, 
but understandably, that would most likely create new problems, especially politically. 
The idea with allowing few big states the power of veto was that when the 
great powers of the world agree, they could maintain a balance and have the capacity to 
persuade others to follow and apply the resolutions. Also, since not all states hold the 
membership of the Security Council, not all nations and their (democratically elected 
governments) can affect the Resolutions which leaves most of the world unrepresented 
when it comes to the decisions made. In an international organization such as the United 
Nations, where the basis of international co-operation lies in nations being represented by 
freely elected governments, and thus democracy, it can be said that some of the procedures 
of the organization itself are fairly undemocratic.  
Johnstone argues that more open and inclusive discussion and repairing what 
he calls the “deliberative deficit”134 could be a way of addressing the democratic deficit of 
the actions of the Security Council. Of course, that might propose the problem of 
decreasing the efficiency of the Council as the organ designed for swift and effective 
actions when a threat to or breach of the international peace occurs. 
The main dilemma would then lie between the efficacy of the Council and the democracy 
of it, as there are dilemmas between the efficacy of law and the concept of rule of law. 
The United Nations is a creation of international law, and as such, should 
logically not even have been able to acquire more power than that the sphere of 
international law itself entails. As international law is both based on, and limited by, the 
idea of sovereignty of each state, drafting an international treaty that binds those sovereign 
states above all else and unlike any other treaty135 is bound to result in difficulty with 
interpretation.   
 Despite the obvious problems of the European Union which are unraveling 
with the ongoing economic crisis, it should not be forgotten, that the Union also has a 
variety of merits – possibly one of the most impressive being the inclusion of the Union in 
the European Convention of Human Rights and developing the applicability of human 
rights norms within the Union. Can something similar be achieved on a universal, global 
level? Perhaps not, but that does not mean that balancing the power of the Security Council 
                                                
134 Johnstone, 2008 p. 303-307 
135 On the supremacy of the United Nations Charter, see article 103 of the Charter. 
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by introducing a form of counterweight to its authority should not be a future agenda of all 
those concerned of the nonexistent human rights guarantees the Council offers for the time 
being.   
A counterweight to the Security Council’s powers, whether connected to the 
General Assembly or a court of law, could be used to pull back when the authority of the 
Council is being exploited to further goals other than international peace and security – or 
human rights. Obviously none of this is unproblematic, but the need for the redevelopment 
of international institutions and organizations to meet the expectations of an ever-changing 
world, cannot be overlooked.  
Richard Falk emphasizes in his article the importance of international law as 
a tool working towards world order.136 International law is still created by sovereign states 
through negotiations and is a strong stepping-stone on the way to a new world order. 
Nonetheless, it is a tool that can only be used to promote slow, gradual changes which can 
prove both its greatest asset and defect. Gradual changes may be easier to promote and 
adjust to, but may turn out too slow to accommodate the possibly much more rapid 
changes in the composition of the world. 
The non-members of the Security Council are entitled to take part in  the 
Council’s otherwise private meetings, when the decisions “specially” affect their interests 
and it has been debated, whether the legislative action of the Security Council would 
require the inclusion of a larger part of the general membership of the United Nations in 
the process.137 The right of a non-member of the Council to participate in the meetings 
when the discussed matter is of special importance to that state does not, however, form a 
prerequisite to the legality of the emerging resolution, should the state or states in question 
not be present.  
The arguments for a more transparent and open process of decision-making 
in the Security Council to promote a wide support for the decisions in the general 
membership, although warranted, sometimes fail to note the fact that the approval of the 
general membership is not strictly necessary.138 While the support and acceptance of the 
general membership does facilitate the application of the resolutions, the expectation of 
                                                
136 Falk, Richard: Can International Law Contribute to World Order? American Society of International Law 
Proceedings vol 66, p. 268-271, 1972 
137 Talmon, 2005 p. 186 
138 See Talmon , 2005 p. 186-188 on the reasons for the Council to include the general membership into the 
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“legislation unpopular with the wider membership139” becoming “dead letters140” can be 
questioned. The supremacy of the Security Council resolutions is still widely accepted, 
despite the decision of the European Court of Justice to reject the application of the 
resolutions relevant to the Kadi case within the scope of European Union law, since the 
Court did still declare itself incompetent to review the legality of the resolutions altogether. 
Technically, the Security Council lacks means of enforcement, if a resolution 
is strongly objected to. However, the permanent membership of the Security Council was 
chosen specifically to provide the Council with both political and military power and thus 
generate an impression of credibility, in order to avoid the shortcomings of the 
predecessor. As yet, non-compliance with the resolutions of the Council has not developed 
into a problem, despite the criticism the Council’s extensive competence and at times 
broad interpretation of the Charter has evoked.  
The statement made here is not to suggest that non-compliance could not be 
provoked, if the Security Council was to act beyond the powers appointed to it by the 
United Nations Charter. On the contrary, if the general membership of the Council is 
provided with reasons to expect the Council to no longer perform the peacekeeping duties 
for the benefit of the rest of the world as well as for the permanent members, the credibility 
of the institution would no doubt collapse. That is precisely why several scholars urge the 
Council to develop the decision-making processes to a more transparent and open 
direction.141 
Cracks in the respect and compliance for the decisions of the Security 
Council, or at least the Sanctions Committee it has established can already be seen to form. 
The fact that the Security Council Sanctions Committee has to this day still not de-listed 
Yasin al-Qadi142 despite the obvious tensions between fundamental human rights and the 
asset freezes with no regard for due process, has already led the membership of the United 
Nations to conflict with their human rights obligations. 
What remains certain, is that to maintain its effectiveness, the Security 
Council will need to focus on the legitimacy and credibility of its actions, whether they 
ever become monitored by an independent, external organ or not. As has been stated, a 
perception of legitimacy of the actions of the Security Council will draw states to comply 
with its resolutions and seek its approval for their own actions.  
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Keeping both the permanent members and the non-members content with the 
Council’s performance as the peacekeeper and the police of the international community is 
essential to the survival of the Security Council in the midst of the political and 
environmental upheavals still to come. In terms of the resolutions obliging states to freeze 
the assets of individuals or groups suspected of funding terrorist activities, the completion 
of the list and the detailing of the measures to be taken might be best left to the states 
themselves. The national courts would be better suited to handle pleas if the targeted 
individuals should wish to deny the allegations and defend themselves.  
Effectiveness of implementation and quality of deliberation have been 
considered to reflect on each other, so that effectiveness can be increased by improving the 
quality of deliberation, the conclusion being that the actions of the Council are more 
legitimate than critics wish to appreciate. This would be because deliberation allows 
proposals for reform to be heard.143  
However, the mere fact that it is possible to allow the input of the critics to be 
taken into account does not seem sufficient to create legitimacy on its own. The Council, 
with no appointed instance of judicial review can interfere significantly in the individual 
rights and the fear that the permanent five members might be willing to adjust to that to 
ensure the ability to combat for example international terrorism, is very much justifiable. 
Again, citizens are awarded protection against their national governments through legal 
guarantees that the state will assure a certain sphere of individual rights and freedoms, 
while states are not protected against obligations produced by international organizations 
to break their commitments to the citizens?  The conflict is evident. 
The Security Council resolutions could still very well form an obligation for 
states to develop their legislation to criminalize certain behaviour or engage in closer 
cooperation to prevent international crimes, but producing a comprehensive list of 
individuals to be targeted without including a detailed account of the reasons why each 
particular person is listed or presenting de-listing options is unacceptable. Regrettably it 
must be admitted, that the efficacy of the resolutions in the fight against terrorism does 
suffer if this conclusion is accepted.  
States may have a variety of different conceptions between themselves when 
it comes to defining which individuals or entities need to be put in the list. Coherent and 
straightforward description of what constitutes terrorism or funding of terrorism is should 
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be considered more called for than actual lists of individuals. The backwards approach in 
the matter resulted in the creation of the latter, but a common definition of terrorism was 
left unattained.144 
That being said, I would consider the legislative capacity of the Council a 
welcome addition to its powers to support its effectiveness, when executed in accordance 
with the human rights and the purposes and principles of the charter. The judicial function 
should, however, be reviewed with more caution, especially regarding its usage towards 
individuals.  
Determinacy of norms strengthens their compliance-pull by making them 
more likely to be applied in the same manner in other similar situations and placing the 
judiciaries in an important position when improving the determinacy and thus, legitimacy 
of the international norms. The European Court of Human Rights can be awarded the 
credit for increasing the determinacy of the norms of the European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.  The Court has among other 
things enhanced the specificity and thus legitimacy of for example freedom of expression 
by having made distinctions considering the possible legitimate restrictions and the 
execution of the freedom of expression.145 
All in all, through the application and development of international law, as 
well as national law, the emphasis is undoubtedly always in finding a balance between 
different interests. What I attempt to claim here, is not that the Security Council should be 
stripped of all the power it holds and that the decision making should firmly return to 
national parliaments, but that attention must be paid on finding a better balance between 
the two.  
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